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**MR. MOLOTOV'S
STUBBORNNESS**

AT the recent Four-Power Conference in Berlin, Mr. Molotov among other things placed before the three Western representatives a project for the organization of European security on the lines of a European pact of collective security. On that occasion the project failed to arouse a livelier interest at the Conference, nor did it increase the confidence of the European public opinion in Soviet intentions. The whole idea, namely, is based on assumptions which not only made it unacceptable as a formula, but also as a basis or even a motive for a serious discussion on such an important question as European security. Now, in the midst of the election campaign, Molotov again raises this question, calling upon the European countries to come out with amendments, supplements and corrections, which the Soviet project allegedly permits and requires. In the meantime, the Polish Government, doubtless acting in keeping with the corresponding plan of Soviet policy addressed to the European countries, particularly France, a message asking them to consider the same question on the lines of the proposal made by the Soviets in Berlin.

It would be useless, if not unnecessary, to try to find out by careful scrutiny why Soviet policy insists so much on this question at the present moment. If it starts from the belief that the problem is timely as well as popular, then it is certainly not mistaken, but it is labouring under a delusion if it hopes that certain ideas and theses, if persistently reiterated, would become more convincing and acceptable than they were in the past, for the experience which the European nations had with the policy of the USSR above all imposes caution and vigilance. But what can still be said in connection with the plan for European collective security after the Soviet version, is sufficient to shed light on the Soviets' underlying motives and aims.

The starting point in the Soviet proposal is the maintenance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, that is,

Europe is required to reconcile itself once and for all with the present state of affairs in that area, where instead of independent countries stands a bloc organized and controlled by the USSR. And while the USSR has not shown least inclination to bring about a change in that situation, its project of collective security in Europe provides for the shattering of all similar defensive alliances or organizations set up on the other side, in the first place as a reply to the Eastern bloc and to a corresponding policy pursued by the USSR in the past. To be more concrete, the Soviet project with the slogan „Europe to Europeans“ pre-supposes the isolation of Europe, the elimination of America, the liquidation of purely European military-political mechanisms, such as the EDC and probably other existing agreements and combinations. In short, under the attractive and popular name of „Pact of European Collective Security“, the Soviet proposal urges Europe to prepare its own isolation and demobilization and to place itself at the mercy of definite agreements with the USSR, which would fully keep its positions and domination over Eastern Europe. This would ensure complete hegemony for the USSR and a possibility for dominating Europe. It sounds almost incredible that a policy which has been keeping Europe and the world under pressure and threat of aggression — a policy which to a great extent justified such counter-measures in the West as did not always appear acceptable and adequate, is now presenting the European peoples with such ideas.

The declaration of the Polish Government as well as the explanations given by Molotov in connection with his ideas, contained a special address to France, who holds in her hands the fate of the EDC. Judging by this and by the motivation of the need for creating collective security in Europe in view of a revival of German militarism, one would conclude that Molotov contemplates the prevention of EDC and the drawing of France away from her present alliances and into a Soviet-French coalition, rather than any form of general organization of European nations, which would act as a check on a possible German danger,

but no less on a real Soviet or any other threat. The fact that, under the present conditions France sees in the EDC a poor guarantee for her future security, need not prove a justified reason for Soviet machinations. Perhaps the ever growing uncertainty of EDC should rather be taken as a motive for a broad effort in Europe to formulate and start the building of a real European system of collective security, which would in advance shatter either the Soviet unacceptable assumptions or any other elements which would create possibilities for any one State to retain or establish its hegemony or dominant influence in that system. Equality and independence of all nations in Europe should be the chief basis for any European system of security if there is a wish to ensure a lasting period of peace for the nations in this part of the world.

**TWO AMERICAS IN
CARACAS**

SOON after the Berlin talks another international discussion began in Caracas, where 22 countries of the Pan-American Union met in their tenth conference. The specific geographic and strategic position of the two Americas in the present world situation and their specific mutual relations have forced the conference to include in its agenda just as specific problems. Thus the talks in Caracas greatly differ from those in Berlin, and the conference itself takes an entirely different place in the development of contemporary international relations.

As far as South America is concerned, or at least a majority of its 22 countries, the Caracas Conference should discuss and solve the problems which have been for decades a real cancer-wound on the body of the South Continent. It should create possibilities to speed up their economic development, to free themselves from foreign economic dependence and bring about North America's assistance and cooperation, so that later on they could participate as equal partners in the solving of inter-American and world problems. The United States, as the most developed country in the world, is in a specially privileged position in South America; there it is a factor which commands production, prices and the pace of development. And while South America is vitally interested in abolishing such relations, the United States, due to its present policy

and strategy, views the matter from an entirely different angle. It endeavours to prolong that relationship and to build upon it an inter-American political system, which would enable it to devote greater energies to world politics.

In the background of the discussions and the struggles which are going on in the wide network of committees in Caracas, one can observe strong antagonism. And it is the action of this antagonism that makes it possible for us to understand the course of the discussion, the mutual compromises and the results produced by the Caracas conference in individual fields.

More than a century has elapsed since the proclamation of the „Monroe doctrine“, which was an expression of the American policy of isolationism. At that time the United States themselves, wishing to prevent foreign intervention in its own affairs, and generally in the affairs of all America, proclaimed that they would not interfere in non-American affairs, particularly those of Europe. But that is a thing of the past. Also belonging to the past is the policy of open domination and legal intervention pursued by the United States in South America towards the end of the 19th century. In the 20th century, Argentina and Mexico became rebellious and disobedient, and soon after they had set the example, independence movements began to appear also in other countries of the South. Therefore, when the United States got out of its isolationism and sailed into the sea of world politics, which it was often forced to do in this century against its own wish, it had no other alternative but to regulate, on a corresponding basis, the relations „at home“, in its own neighbourhood — with the countries of South America. In that phase, which coincided with the inter war period, came Roosevelt's „good neighbour“ policy, which enabled the United States to overcome the difficulties imposed upon it by the war with Japan and Germany, and earlier also those caused by the great crisis.

In the period after the Second World War, great national and social upheavals took place in South America. Mexico and Argentina were first joined by Bolivia, then by Chile and Guatemala, and other „more loyal“ States are now making efforts towards their economic and national emancipation through a speeding up of the programmes of industrialization and nationalization of home resources and through establishing independent national regimes. In such conditions the Pan-American Union becomes an arena of struggles between two different tendencies, two irreconcilable conceptions. In the opinion of the South American countries, the Pan-American Union, if it is to exist and work at all, should be so directed as to approach more and more closely the ideal of Bolivar, who had imagined it as a democratic body of equal nations. But in the opinion of the United States it is rather an instrument to make the South American States support its own plans in the non-American world. In view of this it can be taken that Hammarskjöld was very rush when, at the opening of the Caracas Conference, he proclaimed the Pan-American Union a

For Peace, Independence and Equality

EVER since President Tito's forthcoming visit to Turkey and Greece was announced it has been drawing increasing public attention throughout the world but particularly in the two friendly countries.

It is already being regarded as a unique opportunity to manifest, in a striking manner, the three countries' unity of views and interests, and to confirm once again the significance of the Tripartite Agreement.

After many years of cold war, which was heavily pressing on the three open Balkan countries, a new atmosphere is being created both in Europe and the rest of the world. Though it was fruitless in terms of concrete results, the Berlin conference will — insofar as it was an attempt to embark upon a road of peaceful negotiating and solving of disputed issues — nevertheless contribute to reconciliation in Europe and the world, and strengthen the conviction that the cold war belongs to the past. But that does not mean there will no longer be any need for vigilance and defensive efforts, either in the Balkans or in the world. On the contrary, the new conditions will place new tasks before the responsible leaders of the three Balkan countries, for their contribution to the maintenance of peace will be necessary and important. There is no reason to believe that at a time when firm foundations for peace are laid down, the role of the three countries should be less active or less significant than in the period when it was necessary for them to lead in the general readiness to rise and check the danger of aggression and war.

The successful Balkan tripartite cooperation, its development and results, which were so unanimously acclaimed on the first anniversary of the Agreement, shows that in all three countries such policy of cooperation has been so conceived, both in the past and for the future. This policy has no wish to ignore or underestimate the three countries' differences or difficulties, for that would be contrary to the real state of affairs in this cooperation, which, as life in all other spheres, has its problems, contradictions and differences that do not always necessarily arise from the nature of the relations between the three countries. But this in no way decreases the significance of the tripartite cooperation or the prospects for its future development. The first year of this cooperation and the results it has produced point to the exact opposite, and, due to the experience the three Balkan countries had before the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, they are ready to subordinate many other matters and interests to the tripartite cooperation, for its all-round and successful development will best protect their basic interests.

Taking such developments into consideration, the forthcoming visit which President Tito, founder of the new Yugoslavia and of her independence, will make in Turkey and Greece cannot but be taken as an event of the greatest significance for the development of the tripartite cooperation as a policy of peace, security and independence.

In places where for various reasons the present Balkan affairs have not been interpreted in their proper light, people should know that the tripartite cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia comes very close to the solution of regional problems as provided by the United Nations Charter in its section on regional organs. On the other hand, those who consider the constructive action of the tripartite policy to be an obstruction to their anti-Balkan plans and ambitions will have to accept the facts, which are, in our opinion, much stronger than all intrigues, manoeuvres, threats or wishful thinking, simply because the Balkan peoples have had a bitter experience in the past. The present development in the Balkans is the result of definite strivings and currents in the three countries, and their policy will not be easily changed nor their advance checked. And so the visit of the founder of the new Yugoslavia to friendly Turkey and Greece will have favourable results for all three countries and for the cause of peace, independence and equality in the world.

regional organization built in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

By some outward signs the Caracas Conference recalls the period in which Monroe's "America to the Americans" idea was born, with the only difference that endeavours are now being made to unite the people of the two Americas on a political and ideological basis, through a programme for the united struggle of the American States against communism in America, so as to legalize a joint intervention in case a "communist danger" appears at any point in the Western hemisphere. Guatemala, which was the direct reason for such a United States programme, appears in the eyes of many other South American States as the defender of the independence and sovereign rights of every country, small and big alike. Therefore it is unlikely that the United States plan will easily be approved in Caracas or that Guatemala will be isolated.

So far the meetings in Caracas have shown that things stand quite differently, and that the United States will have to make considerable economic and financial concessions in its programme if it is to save its prestige and preserve even a formal appearance of the organization's unity. Due to all this the Caracas Conference will not be recorded as a significant event in the history of either Pan-Americanism or world politics, but it might be mentioned as a point over which, in a decisive moment, the best possible direction of development and action was imposed upon Pan-Americanism.

UNREST IN ASIA

ONE of the least disputable points made in the estimation of Soviet policy, since it emerged with altered methods and tactics, is that which states that one of the principal aims of that policy is to break the circle of isolation which has tightened around the USSR during the last few years of the cold war. Cold war may be viewed from various sides, through its numerous aspects. Viewed in the light of the Soviet international position, the cold war meant for the USSR gradual loss of all important positions, constant narrowing down of the space for manoeuvring and action in Asia, in the Near and Middle East, and above all in Europe. The USSR saw the end of the cold war squeezed within the boundaries of that area alone which it held firmly under its military control. Even the situation with the People's Republic of China remains unexplained, while the aptitude of the Soviets to influence Chinese decisions is an open question. Besides this, the isolation of the USSR was not referred to in vain as one of the important motives which dictated the well-known changes in its policy.

The non-Soviet world, which brought about this Soviet isolation, was

not homogeneous nor fully unanimous on all the questions. At that time, just as today, considerable differences existed in the aims and tendencies within that world, which was held together primarily by the threat from Soviet aggression and the wish to avoid and prevent war. Individual countries and entire areas differed from each other on some important questions. It is well-known, for example, that groups of countries in South-East Asia and the Near East retained their separate attitudes during the cold war.

How was the policy of these countries formulated at home during the cold war? It was almost unanimously expressed in the efforts to avoid tying itself to either one of the parties in dispute. Retention of full freedom in relation to one or the other side enabled them to coordinate their attitude in each concrete case with a deep wish for mitigating the antagonism between the main powers, to prevent the complete division of the world into two blocs, believing that they would thereby reduce the prospects for a world conflagration.

It would not do to describe this policy in one way or another after a peremptory appraisal, especially if one lost sight of all the special factors which influenced its formation and which will continue to influence the attitude and policy of numerous countries in all areas. Hence practical and political interest calls for a careful consideration of this problem.

The problem of Soviet aggression during the long cold war was not set up for the countries in these areas in that sharp form in which it was presented to the European countries. Separated from the Soviet sphere by larger or smaller areas and natural barriers, and without any special experience of Soviet policy, these countries reacted to the problem of Soviet aggressive threats as one of possible dangers, primarily to peace in Europe. The Soviet policy of threats did not meet with either support or indifference, nor would a war started by the USSR leave them in a state of passivity. But most of the Near East and South-East Asian countries had no wish to ignore the fact that many of their grievances came from outside, and that their development on the economic, national and international fields was hindered and threatened from other sides. Certain conditions were set for ensuring a different estimation of the situation in the world and for a more active policy against the Soviet threats in that part of the

world — conditions which in their entirety would lead to such a situation that these countries would be bound to consider the Soviet threats as threats to their independence, existence and development, — to feel as part of the threatened world. To put it more concretely, the prerequisite for a more active drawing of numerous countries in that area to the side of the supporters of peace, was the liquidation of their semi-colonial status, dependence, inequality and exploitation, not by the USSR, but by the principal Western powers. Hence the policy of these powers towards the USSR could, to a greater or lesser degree, arouse suspicion in the Asian countries, while the efforts made in order to have the Asian countries actively support that policy remained sterile.

The relaxation of the cold war, it was generally considered, seemed to create the long-awaited conditions, in which relations between the great Western powers and the above mentioned countries could be placed on different bases, on such bases as would provide for cooperation in the event of a revived threat by the Soviet or some other aggressor. It turned out, however, that even this belief was the result of a great illusion: the easing of the tension in the relations between East and West was taken, primarily, as a welcome occasion for such action in the Asian area as would, while strengthening the existing semicolonial relations, indefinitely prolong that state of affairs which created so much uncertainty and difficulties during the cold war. The only difference would be in that the present action might have even more serious consequences than in the past. Such consequences would on one hand issue from the fact that the present campaign is widening the gulf between many European countries and the influential countries of Asia, enabling the USSR to embark upon broad manoeuvres in Asia, while, on the other hand, certain dispositions would inevitably be created in the countries subjected to the effects of Western policy, which should neither come as a surprise at a given moment, nor be under-estimated.

The path of Western policy in these areas is obviously wrongly marked out. It could hardly be brought in harmony with either modern international democratic trends or the need for a strategy of peace in the world. One of the first results of that policy could lie perhaps in the breaking of the circle of isolation, which was of such decisive influence for the maintenance of peace in the past.

„Trieste — an Italian Reply to Kardelj“

Another Italian Forgery

INCORRECT STATISTICS

Discussing Kardelj's arguments about the formation of the ethnical structure of the population in the city of Trieste, the Italian pamphlet states:

„Faced with the knowledge that the city of Trieste is overwhelmingly Italian Mr. Kardelj argues that had the normal historical process been allowed to develop undisturbed Trieste would have been submerged by the Yugoslav tide. This is far from being true. On the contrary there is no trace of such an evolutionary process; in 1910, according to the Austrian census, there were in Trieste 148,398 Italians as against 59,319 Slavs and 11,856 Germans. In 1848 the Italians numbered 53,000, the Slavs 21,000 and the Germans 8,000. The proportion between Italians and Slavs had remained the same, while the number of Germans had hardly altered at all, the reason being that they were largely civil servants“.

Edvard Kardelj did not maintain anything that was new or unknown. All those who have studied the ethnical problem of Trieste impartially have reached the same conclusion, for it is the truth that the Slav national group in that city was growing, up to the First World War, at a quicker rate than any other section of the population. Even Italian irredentist writers of the time appraised the situation in much the same way and often expressed their concern at the growth of the Slav element in Trieste.

The Austrian censuses, though they were much nearer the truth than those taken later by the Italians, were not quite impartial towards or just to the Slavs. It must be emphasized that in 1910 the Slavs (Slovenes and Croats) of Trieste numbered not only 59,319 but about 80,000. Angelo Vivante, the Italian writer, himself said so in his book „Irredentismo Adriatico“ (Florence, 1911). This number was arrived at through many real indications (the number of Slovene and Croatian school children in Trieste, election results, etc.). Accordingly, the number of the Italians there was about 20,000 less than indicated by the Austrian statistics. Furthermore, if we take into account that the number of the Trieste Italians also included about 30,000 people of Italian nationality who were not permanent residents in the city, then we can say that in 1910 there were in Trieste about 80,000 Slavs and 100,000 Italians, that is eight Slovenes and Croats to every ten Italians.

In the Italian „reply“ to Kardelj a comparison is made between the 1910 statistical figures and those from 1848. But no data for the year 1848 exist at all. There are some figures from 1942, which were compiled by the historian Pietro Kandler and published in the paper „Istria“ on August 12, 1942, but they are superficial and of a private character. Now the authors of the Italian pamphlet took these figures and presented them to the uninitiated reader as authentic statistics from 1848. That these „statistical“ figures are really superficial is shown by the fact that they are given in full thousands.

Had the authors of the „reply“ to Kardelj really wanted to get as near to the truth as possible they could have used the statistical data from 1846, which are found in the book by an Italian, G. Marinelli, „Italiani, tedeschi e slavi nel cosiddetto Litorale austriaco“ (Venezia, 1885). Why they did not use these figures can be explained by the fact that G. Marinelli says that Trieste's population in 1846 consisted of 46,530 Italians and 25,300 Slavs. Moreover one could ask why they did not say that, according to the first population census taken in the municipality of Trieste in 1735,

SOME time ago the Italian Embassy in London forwarded to all British papers a pamphlet called „Trieste — An Italian Reply to Mr. Kardelj“.

This pamphlet, as its title implies, was Italy's official answer to an article on the problem of Trieste by Edvard Kardelj which had appeared in the Yugoslav paper Borba in October 1953. In that article, Edvard Kardelj described the historical development of the Trieste problem and gave some facts and figures which show how groundless the Italian attitude is in that problem. The impression the article made on western readers was so unfavourable for the Italian policy that the Rome Government made another attempt with this pamphlet to dispute the value of Kardelj's arguments.

That this was Rome's real intention is best shown by the introductory paragraph in the pamphlet, which reads as follows:

„The Yugoslav propaganda Bureau in London has distributed in pamphlet form an article by Mr. Edward Kardelj, which had been published in Borba on the 25th and 26th of October 1953. Mr. Kardelj is the next most prominent public figure in Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito and at present he holds the office of Deputy Prime Minister; he was Foreign Minister for a number of years and led the Yugoslav Delegation at the Peace Conference. On the Italian side it is considered very desirable for this Yugoslav publication to be widely known and read in the responsible quarters throughout the Western world, because it is typical of the propaganda methods used by the Belgrade Government. The weakness and absurdity of many of the arguments put forward reveal beyond doubt the inherent weakness of the Yugoslav case. The remarks which follow are intended to correct the false and tendentious statements which appear in the Yugoslav publication, and at the same time to make known the Italian point of view with regard to certain aspects of the Trieste question“.

After this introduction the announced „remarks“ follow under the following headings:

1. The Problem of Trieste Examined from the Ethnical Angle;
2. Economic Problems of Trieste;
3. Historic Precedents;
4. Italy's Alleged Imperialism;
5. The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier and the Great Powers;
6. Blackmail and Facts Accomplish;
7. The Significance of the Dispute.

We do not refer to this „reply“ of the Italian Government for the sake of polemics or with the aim of defending the arguments put forward by Edvard Kardelj. We consider that that is unnecessary because the Italian publication has not succeeded in refuting any of his statements. Our sole aim is to point to the manner in which the authors of the pamphlet attempted to do so. The method they used in composing the „reply“ is characteristic of Italian propaganda which relies on distorted facts and falsehoods. The object of this article is to draw the public attention to this fact, so that the reader himself may be able to pass judgment upon such a method, particularly when used in a question of so great importance not only for Italo-Yugoslav relations but also for the general stability in this part of the world.

there were in Trieste 3,865 Italians or „Italianized“ people and 3,385 Slavs? (P. Montanelli: „Il movimento demografico della popolazione di Trieste“, Trieste 1905).

All this shows that the Italian majority in Trieste in 1910, or at any time in the past, was not as great and as sure as responsible Italian people now maintain.

Should one go deeper into the matter and try to find out how the Italians came to be predominant in Trieste, he would inevitably discover that a large number of the Trieste Italians are denationalized Slovenes and Croats. For even the Austrian State sanctioned the process of denationalization. The administration of the city was in the hands of Italians, and economic and other conditions made the efforts to italianize the Slovenes and Croats easier. In the 19th century the Slavs of Trieste fought in vain for permission to open Slav schools. Evidence of the forcible denationalization of Slavs, aimed at creating an Italian majority in Trieste, can be found not only in the book „Irredentismo Adriatico“ by the Trieste Italian Angelo Vivante, but also in the works by purely irredentist writers such as, for instance, Ruggero Fauro-Timeus („Trieste“, Rome 1914) and Scipio Slataper („Scritti politici“, Trieste 1924).

When at the end of the 19th century the process of denationalization began to weaken, the Slovene and Croatian population of Trieste began to grow and affirm itself in the economic, social, cultural and political fields. Increasing numbers of Slavs from the hinterland came into the city which was rapidly developing at the time. Therefore, it is not illogical to say that the Slav „tide“ could have overflowed the city in due time.

It is on the basis of this growth of the Slav population in Trieste, which the pamphlet of the Italian Embassy in London wants to refute, that the British historian, University Professor A. J. P. Taylor concluded:

„Had the Austrian empire lasted for another generation, Trieste would have acquired a Yugoslav majority“ („Trieste“, published as a separate booklet in London in 1945).

To those who are interested in the ethnical development of Trieste we can recommend the writings of a number of Italian irredentist authors and political leaders. In their books one can find many categorical assertions that the Slav „tide“ in Trieste was very strong and „dangerous“ before the First World War. They all considered that that „tide“ was a threat to the italianism of Trieste. Their books contain numerous figures which illustrate the economic, cultural and political strength of the Trieste Slavs, before whom the Italian majority was gradually retreating. Kardelj's arguments, which the Italian publication now set out to dispute, are substantiated by the works of the irredentist writers, Mario Alberti, Ruggero Fauro-Timeus, Scipio Slataper, Giorgio Pitacco, Attilio Tamaro, Virginio Gayda, Luigi Barzini and others, but particularly those of the socialist Angelo Vivante, who interpreted events impartially, without any nationalistic tendencies.

Consequently, it would not be exaggerating to say that had there not been the First World War and the 25 years of Italian domination, i. e. 25 years of the most ruthless denationalization of the Slavs, people would no longer speak about the Italian majority in Trieste.

THE F. T. T. BELONGS TO THE HINTERLAND.

Though there are more Italians than Slavs in the Free Territory (the city of Trieste and the two zones taken together), Italy has no right to annex it, because it is ethnically Yugoslav territory, whose character cannot be determined on the basis of the accidental Italian majority in Trieste and some other coastal towns. The whole territory belongs to its hinterland which is purely Slav in character. This is precisely what Kardelj maintained in his article.

Attempting to contradict this principle, the authors of the Italian pamphlet say:

„This unconvincing and useless argument of his leads him to the conclusion that the Italian majority in the towns must follow the fate of the rural minority. If such a case were presented in a court of law it would be regarded as a mere quibble for it is perfectly clear to every person with common sense that town and country are interdependent. Just as it is absurd to say that the ethnical character of a country should be determined by the inhabited

centres only, it is even more preposterous to say that its character should be determined by the countryside alone“.

The London publication tries to refute a principle which has not originated in Yugoslavia. Prominent people outside the borders of Yugoslavia have defended this principle. Here is what the French writer J. Morgan said about it in his „Essai sur les Nationalités“:

„The national character of a town cannot be determined without taking into account the rural territory on which it lies. No town can be given to a State unless it is given together with its surrounding rural territory, for a town belongs to the nation which is predominant in its surroundings“.

Trieste and some other towns, where, on a limited area, the Italian majority lives, are nothing but isolated pockets in ethnical Yugoslav territory. The ethnic border between Italy and Yugoslavia lies West of Trieste, and no other lines can be drawn on the eastern side of that border. It is true that a town and its hinterland are interdependent. But no hinterland is vitally linked to a town, and it can be separated from it if that town is to be given to another State. In such a case the town would not be able to exist. It must be emphasized that in Trieste the Italian majority is concentrated in the very centre of the city, on an area of only 5.5 square kilometres, and that the area of Zone A is 222 square kilometres and that of Zone B 516 square kilometres. With what right, then, does Italy demand that 738 square kilometres of purely Yugoslav territory should be attached to those 5.5 square kilometres and incorporated in her own borders?

POOR FORGERIES

The authors of the Italian pamphlet use ordinary falsehoods. They do so particularly when trying to contradict Kardelj's assertion that the port of Trieste, the main pillar of the city's economy, depends on its hinterland, which is mostly Yugoslav. In the London publication we read the following:

„The truth is that under the Austro-Hungarian empire the traffic in the port of Trieste was almost entirely Austrian and Czechoslovak; Italy came next and Yugoslavia lagged behind. One may note that (according to the statistics of the Trieste Chamber of Commerce) in 1913 the traffic was divided as follows: Austria 30.2%, Czechoslovakia 21.9%, Italy 16.1% and the regions which now make Yugoslavia 15.5%; there followed Hungary with 8.8% and Germany with 6.5%“.

None of these figures is correct. According to the statistics of the Trieste Chamber of Commerce, which is the most competent body in these matters, in 1913 Trieste's land traffic, i. e. the traffic which is essential in this discussion, was divided as follows: Carniola 15.45%, the Slovene Littoral and Istria 15.55%, Styria 12.71%, Carinthia 8.07%, Bohemia and Moravia 25.31%, Austria 13.83%. The remainder of about 9% went to Galicia, the Tyrol, Hungary, Croatia, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, etc.

Now if we take the percentages of the Yugoslav lands and add to them a part of the percentage of the lands which are partially Yugoslav, we find that in 1913 the Yugoslav hinterland accounted for 35% of the total traffic through the port of Trieste. And that is much more than any other region. In the Italian publication, however, this percentage was decreased more than twice — to 15.5%. If this is not an ordinary falsehood, what is it?

It would be interesting to know how did the authors of the pamphlet arrive at that 16% which they ascribe to Italy's share in the Trieste traffic. Statistics show that Trieste's freight traffic with Italy amounted to 85,757 tons, while the total traffic of its port was 2,697,545 tons. This means that Italy's share in that traffic was only 3%, and not 16% as the London publication would like us to believe.

Bearing in mind that Italy's share in the Trieste traffic was 3% and Yugoslavia's 35%, then it will not be difficult to decide which is Trieste's hinterland and where the port of Trieste gets its livelihood from.

The authors of the Italian „reply“ must have reckoned that nobody would check their figures or compare them with the real statistics. The same methods of distort-

ting facts they also used in the discussion of other economic problems of Trieste so as to „prove“ their arguments. In view of that we consider it unnecessary to refer to any other economic arguments put forward in the Italian publication. Instead we shall dwell briefly on the paragraphs dealing with the strivings of the Trieste Italians for the unification of Italy in the past, or, better, said, in the 19th century. Kardelj maintained that in the middle of the past century the Slovenes of Trieste had advocated the unification of all South Slavs through the Slav papers they published there. The national aspirations of the Slavs in Trieste really preceded those of the Italians. However, the pamphlet issued by the Italian Embassy in London states:

„The Italian national insurrection of 1848 met with prompt and active response in Trieste where a national guard was constituted whose character was manifestly and openly Italian; and as early as 1815 Domenico Rossetti, Public Attorney for the Trieste borough, had stated that the city was part of Italy. In 1821 the patriotic Secret Society of the Carbonari was active both in Trieste and Istria“.

These allegations are not true either. They can be contradicted on the basis of many Italian historic documents. These documents show:

Firstly, that Domenico Rossetti, though he was an Italian who had done much for Italian culture in Trieste, was against the annexation of Trieste by Italy. He fought for the city's autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian empire. All his writings were devoted to that end. This is borne out by the irredentist historian, Attilio Tamaro, in his „Storia di Trieste“.

Secondly, that the movement of the Carbonari, who fought for the unification of Italy, had no response in Trieste at all. Later on the ideas of Mazzini and Garibaldi had some followers, but very few. This, too, is shown by Tamaro, who presented these facts as a deplorable truth.

Thirdly, that the revolutionary year of 1848 had no influence on the Italians of Trieste as on those of Piedmont and Venetia. The Italians of Trieste were too loyal to the Emperor's Vienna to be easily swayed. This fact has been discussed in numerous treatises, and Tamaro himself writes of the anger of the Venetians, who attacked the Italians of Trieste accusing them of thinking only of their material welfare and neglecting the national, Italian interests. Tamaro says that in 1848 the Italians of Trieste „feared that the national movement would deprive them of many sources of their wealth“.

The Trieste Italians maintained the same attitude towards the possibility of Italy's annexation of Trieste to this century. Mario Alberti, the irredentist writer, says in his „Irredentismo senza romanticismi“ that just before the First World War only 2% of Trieste's 250,000 inhabitants supported irredentism. And that means about 5,000 people, of whom, according to Alberti, only about 500 were active irredentists who fought for the city's incorporation into Italy.

In the chapter entitled „Italy's Alleged Imperialism“, the authors of the pamphlet attempt to contest the assertion that Italy has always pursued an imperialist policy towards Yugoslavia. At the same time they wish to show that Yugoslavia herself is an imperialist country, and, with that aim in mind, they quote a sentence from Kardelj's article. Kardelj, speaking about the region of Gorica, which was incorporated into Italy by the Peace Treaty of 1947, said: „... certain Yugoslav lands which are still under Italy“. Quoting this sentence, the writers of the Italian „reply“ triumphantly exclaim: „In this sentence there is concealed a threat... implying that Yugoslav demands have not ended“. And presenting things so as to show that the Yugoslavs, who accuse Italy of laying imperialist claims on their lands, are themselves imperialists because they lay a claim on the region of Gorica, they say: „Judging on the facts as they are, the impartial reader will be able to decide who is the real imperialist“.

According to this pamphlet the Yugoslavs ought to be considered imperialists simply because they speak of their own territories which have been given to Italy. In attempting to prove their case the authors of the Italian publication keep reminding the reader of the „loss of Italian lands“. For instance: „The Yugoslavs have annexed Italian territories and are now claiming others“. Or: „No one takes into account that Italy has lost (not reckoning the F. T. T.) 7,659 square kilometres of her national soil“. All this is designed to lead the uninitiated reader to the conclusion that Istria and the Slovene Littoral are „Italian

lands“, which Italy has lost, and that the region of Gorica is „Italian territory“. This distorting of facts creates just the opposite effect, because Istria, the Slovene Littoral and the region of Gorica are purely Yugoslav lands, and those who consider them as Italian territories only show that nothing has changed in the imperialist policy of Italy.

Speaking about Italian imperialism in the past, Kardelj in his article mentioned the Treaty of Rapallo of 1920. People who are acquainted with the circumstances under which this treaty was signed know that it was imposed on Yugoslavia. But, despite that, the writers of the Italian „reply“, attempting to deny the imperialist character of Italian policy, write:

„To speak of the last extremity of Venezia Giulia still under Italian sovereignty as the remnants of Mussolini's imperialism is a gross falsehood. Venezia Giulia was not annexed by the Fascist regime but by democratic Italy at the end of the First World War and as a result of the Treaty of Rapallo, which was freely negotiated by Yugoslavia, and signed by Giolitti and Sforza“.

The Treaty of Rapallo of 1920 was a dictate imposed on Yugoslavia. Two Western powers, Britain and France, feeling bound by the obligations they had undertaken towards Italy under the 1915 London Agreement, and wishing to secure Italy's support for their post-war schemes, stood by Italy in the Yugoslav-Italian frontier dispute, and, immediately before the Rapallo negotiations, exerted strong pressure on Yugoslavia, confronting her with a difficult alternative: she was either to give in to the Italian territorial demands or lose their „friendship“. Due to the internal weaknesses of Yugoslavia and of her foreign policy, the then Yugoslav Government, faced with the pressure from London and Paris, together with Italian military threats, signed the Rapallo dictate. The reader who would like to know the details of how Yugoslavia's signature to that document was extorted would do well to read „Libro Verde“, a collection of diplomatic documents edited by Carlo Sforza, who signed that dictate. In many of these documents Sforza openly described how, due largely to his endeavours, Rome, Paris and London had forced Yugoslavia to surrender in Rapallo. We leave to the reader himself to decide whether this is alleged or real imperialism.

Kardelj, talking about Italian imperialism in the past, mentioned the Second World War, the aggression against Yugoslavia and the occupation and annexation of new Yugoslav territories. Here is what the Italian „reply“ says about that:

„There is no doubt that this was a gross mistake to be deprecated as was the declaration of war against the Allies, the alliance with Germany and Fascism's racial policy. But if a dictatorial regime took certain steps which went against both the spirit and the wishes of the Italian people does it necessarily follow that all Italians are incurable Fascists? Who would honestly maintain for instance that there is any anti-semitism in Italy? The annexation of Ljubljana and of other Yugoslav territories was an act which met with no response in Italy and which on the contrary was sincerely deplored. The fact is that Italy has already paid and paid severely for the Fascist war; she has yielded to Yugoslavia 7,659 sq. km. of her national soil with a population of over 200,000 Italians and this naturally is without taking into account those residing in zone B — which has been occupied and not annexed by Yugoslavia“.

This passage of the Italian „reply“ says that the annexation of Ljubljana and other Yugoslav territories was disapproved in Italy. But why did not the authors of the pamphlet say which are the „other“ Yugoslav territories that were annexed by Italy in 1941? They were Dalmatia and the Croatian Littoral. Today Rome generously gives up its claims on Ljubljana, but not on Dalmatia as well. The authors of the „reply“ do not say whether Mussolini's annexation of Dalmatia was also „sincerely deplored“. Though the pamphlet says that the 1941 war and the conquering of other peoples' territories was against the wishes of the Italian people, the responsible Italian leaders do not confirm that by deeds today. The 1941 war drives are still being glorified in Italy and decorations awarded to military units and individuals for their merits in the aggression, particularly that against Yugoslavia, while the Italian Government has not punished or turned to Yugo-

slavia any of the soldiers who committed crimes in Yugoslavia during the war and who, according to an allied agreement, were placed on the list of war criminals. What, then, does the Italian Embassy in London „deplore“?

Another question: what is the meaning of the assertion that for her aggression Italy has „paid and paid severely“ to Yugoslavia with 7,659 sq. km. of her „national soil“? The term „paid“ is tendentiously used here. The fact is that the Yugoslavs liberated not Italian but their own national territories which Italy had taken from them after the First World War or occupied in the Second World War. The very fact that Italy continues to consider these territories for „her own“ shows the real aims of Italian policy towards Yugoslavia.

It is not true that there are 200,000 Italians in the lands which were incorporated into Yugoslavia, namely in Istria and the Slovene Littoral. A population census taken on March 15, 1948, shows that there were in those territories 439,275 people of whom only 72,322 were Italians. From 1945 to the day of the census about 13,000 Italians had emigrated. If we now take the number of the Italians to have been 85,000, then it is clear that Italy has never had any right to those lands, and that she has not paid for her aggression against Yugoslavia with anything, whereas, on the other hand, about 80,000 Slovenes have remained within the borders of Italy.

AN „UNKNOWN“ STATEMENT BY A KNOWN IRRIDENTIST

Since with these falsehoods they have „shown“ that Italy has never been and is not today an imperialist State, but that Yugoslavia herself has imperialist ambitions, the writers of the London publication go on and say:

„Italy considers the dispute limited exclusively to the Free Territory of Trieste and is willing to reach a compromise within the F. T. T. She does not reclaim those territories ceded to Yugoslavia by the Peace Treaty in spite of the fact that the loss of those Italian lands was extremely painful and hard to bear“.

This passage is very significant for it shows us for the first time that Italy has no interests outside the Free Territory of Trieste, and that she renounces everything else. (Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia included). In order to prove this limiting of claims, the pamphlet quotes the following statement which Pella, in his capacity as Premier, gave to the American paper Cleveland Plain Dealer on October 27, 1953:

„No members of this or any preceding Italian Government have either advanced or encouraged any claims on territories which are now part of Yugoslavia as a result of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris on February 10th 1947“.

Why, one may ask, did the then Italian Premier give such a statement to a relatively little known American paper, and why had not he, or any of his predecessors, ever said anything to that effect in Italy? Furthermore, that statement has not been reproduced by the Italian press. Or, why has not the Italian Embassy found another such statement to substantiate so important a „reply“ to Kardelj? The answer to these queries is easy: the Italian statesmen take good care not to make any such announcements because they want to keep „the door open“.

Moreover, what Pella told the correspondent of that American paper is far from being true. That was an ordinary falsehood, and is now served to the uninitiated Western reader. Pella himself, just like other officials in Rome, forwards and encourages Italy's claims on Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia.

At a meeting in Marleto del Graglia on June 20, 1951. Giuseppe Pella, who was then Minister in De Gasperi's cabinet, spoke about Italy's return to Dalmatia. On September 13, 1953, Pella, then Prime Minister, addressed a crowd at Campidoglio in Rome. In the course of his speech there, he referred to a message which Abraham Lincoln had allegedly sent in 1853, stating that Italy had a right to the entire Adriatic coast, from Rijeka to the Gulf of Kotor. Pella knew that that message was a forgery, but he nevertheless used it to give an indirect encouragement to the Italian claims on Yugoslav lands. On November 4, 1953, Pella attended in Redipuglie, near the Yugoslav frontier,

a celebration of the Italian victory in the First World War, where, accompanied with ministers and generals, he watched a military march. The Italian papers reported afterwards that Pella stood beneath a flying flag of Rijeka, the symbol of irredentism which claims many Yugoslav lands beyond Trieste. In Ancona on October 10, 1953, a great irredentist manifestation was organized to demand that the town of Rijeka should again be incorporated within Italy's borders; the Italian Government was officially represented by Minister Tambroni, Tambroni, speaking to the gathered irredentists who displayed flags of Trieste, Rijeka and Dalmatia, said on behalf of the Government that the Italian flag would soon be flying in Trieste, and later be carried on to Rijeka and farther. The President of the Italian Republic himself found it necessary to send a telegram expressing his solidarity with the organizers of the manifestation. These are only a few of the examples showing that high officials of Italy support and encourage irredentist claims on Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia. It is not a secret either that the Rome Government finances the irredentist movement, for there are many documents to prove that.

It was due to all this that Pella gave the statement that Italy has no interests outside the Free Territory of Trieste only to a small American paper. The other allegations contained in the pamphlet that Italy has no imperialist aspirations rest on similar „arguments“. Were we to analyze the pamphlet in detail nothing would remain of it but empty phrases, gross falsehoods and some „temperamento“.

THE LATEST BLUFF

We shall consider only one more detail — the assertion that Italy has limited her claims only to the Free Territory of Trieste, and that she allegedly strives for a settlement of the question with Yugoslavia. But what kind of settlement do the Italians want? Here is their proposal:

„With regard to this question (F. T. T., Ed.), although backed by as weighty a document as the Tripartite declaration which affirms her right to the whole of the F. T. T., Italy is prepared to accept a compromise based on a continuous ethnic line — that is she favours a frontier line guided by the principle that minorities follow majorities. Should it not be possible to reach a settlement along these lines, Italy is in favour, as we have seen, of appealing directly to the people concerned through a plebiscite. Seeing that Yugoslavia has rejected the proposal for a plebiscite and has turned down any possible territorial compromise dividing the whole of the F. T. T., that is both zone A and B, between Italy and Yugoslavia, Italy has accepted the 8th of October decision as a modus vivendi which would permit her to establish better relations with Beograd“.

This passage probably surprises all those who are acquainted with the real state of affairs in the Trieste problem. We shall here discuss only the 8th of October decision (by which the United States and Great Britain wanted to hand Zone A over to Italy) and the mentioned modus vivendi. We know that the Rome Government has accepted the 8th of October decision not as a final solution of the problem or a modus vivendi with Yugoslavia, but as a basis upon which to wage a further and more successful struggle against Yugoslavia so as to realize the idea of the Tripartite declaration in full. Pella, who was then Premier himself declared in Parliament on October 9, 1953, that the 8th of October decision „in no way settles the fate of the Free Territory of Trieste or prevents Italy from trying to realize her claims by the most suitable methods“. Later Pella spoke many times of the necessity to apply the Tripartite declaration and of a plebiscite as a means of doing so after Italy's entry in Zone A in accordance with the 8th of October decision.

The Italian pamphlet, however, would have us believe that the 8th of October decision was received in Rome with resignation because all earlier proposals (ethnic line, plebiscite) had not had any success. The Italians seem to say: let us into Zone A and everything will be in order. For that is how their modus vivendi would normally be interpreted.

Why then is Zone A being mentioned throughout the „reply“ to Kardelj, and why this passage at the end?

(Continued on page 11)

G. D. H. COLE

Professor of the Oxford University

British Labour and the German Problem

This article is written by our permanent correspondent in London, Mr. G. D. H. Cole, Professor of the Oxford University. In the article Mr. Cole states his opinion — which is also shared by a section of the Labour party — about one of the most important problems of today's Europe, the problem of Germany and her rearmament.

AS I sit down to write this article, the British Labour Party is entering upon its most serious internal dispute about policy since the Bevanite quarrel of two years ago. The present dispute concerns directly the attitude to be taken up by the Party in respect of the re-armament of Western Germany; but it also involves the whole question of Defence policy in relation to the White Paper on that subject which the Conservative Government issued on the morrow of the Berlin Conference. There are in fact two main issues: Are British Socialists to support the rearmament of Western Germany within the framework of the European Defence Community and of the American alliance? and: Are they to give general support to the Conservatives' Defence programme, which appears to involve an indefinite continuance of military expenditure at a very high level and of two years' compulsory service in the armed forces?

It needs to be made clear at the outset that the antagonists in the present dispute are not the same as those who confronted one another in the Bevanite quarrel. The Bevanites are indeed all on the one side, opposed both to the re-arming of Western Germany and to the proposed high rate of military expenditure in Great Britain. But on the present occasion they are joined by other large groups within the Party, especially on the first of these issues, but also to a substantial extent on the second. The present dispute is not a simple confrontation of right and left wings: there are many in the Party who, without sharing the sentiments of the left, are strongly against re-arming Germany on any terms, and also many who feel that the new Defence proposals threaten to impose on the British economy a quite intolerable burden. There are, moreover, many who reject the view, put forward by Mr. Morrison and Mr. Attlee, that the acceptance of German re-armament follows logically on the failure of the Berlin Conference to solve the German problem, and are unable to agree that the Conference's breakdown was all the Russians' fault.

As matters now stand, the Attlee-Morrison policy has been approved by a majority vote both of the Labour Members of Parliament and of the National Executive of the Party; but in both cases the majority was very small indeed, and will certainly not be accepted in the Party as the last word. The right to determine policy rests finally in the hands neither of the M. Ps. nor of the Executive but of the Annual Conference of delegates from the local Parties and affiliated Trade Unions, which meets normally in October; and it is to be presumed that the struggle will be resumed there. Some people are indeed demanding the convocation of a special Conference to settle it at once; but this is not very likely, nor would it be wholly satisfactory. With opinion sharply divided, and in many cases still unformed, time is needed for discussion before a really democratic decision can be reached. A hastily summoned Conference would tend to reflect the opinion of leaders uninformed of their followers' views, and would probably reproduce much the same narrow division as has appeared among the M. Ps. and on the National Executive. By October debate within the Party may well have led to a much more decisive crystallisation of attitude. But, unfortunately, the march of events will not wait upon the processes of democratic debate: the Party will have to act long before

October — indeed it has acted already in Parliament and at the meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International on the decision of the narrow majority which the Attlee-Morrison group secured. It cannot, however, act with any confidence in face of the present divisions of opinion, especially as the matter is, for many Socialists, one not so much of expediency as of fundamental principle, on which they will not be prepared to accept last week's verdict, at any rate until it has been confirmed by the Party as a whole.

This does not mean that the Labour Party is at present threatened with a split. The opponents of German re-armament and of the new Defence White Paper do not constitute a coherent opposition within the Party, as the Bevanites seemed to do; and they have certainly no intention of splitting away from it. For this very reason, they may be much more influential, if they are able to act together on a limited range of issues and cannot be represented by their opponents as „disloyalists“. The weakness of the Bevanites was that they allowed themselves to be isolated from a large body of middle opinion, which at least half agreed with them. This made it possible to stir up the greater part of the Trade Union leadership against them. But on the present occasion important Trade Union leaders who are usually in opposition to the left are at one with it; and it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the Trade Union vote at the Party Conference will be cast mainly in favour of the official view. Under the Party constitution, the affiliated Trade Unions always have the deciding voice when it comes to a vote; for the members who subscribe to the Party through a Trade Union greatly outnumber those who belong individually to the local Labour Parties. The active minority, as far as it consists of Trade Unionists, subscribes in both ways; but most Trade Unionists pay only through their Trade Unions. Ordinarily, this way of membership carries with it very little real participation in the Labour Party's affairs; for most Trade Union branches spend little time on political discussions, and Trade Union delegates at the Party Conference are hardly ever mandated by their members to vote in any particular way. Usually, the Union's delegates decide at a meeting held at the Conference how to cast the Union's votes; and in most cases the vote is cast solid in accordance with the decision of a majority of the Union's delegates — though a few Unions divide their votes to represent both majority and minority views. As against this, the voting strength of the individual members of the Labour Party is parted out among hundreds of local Parties, whose delegates are usually instructed by local meetings how to vote on the principal issues. The vote of the local Parties thus tends to represent the attitudes of the local Party activists, whereas the Trade Union vote is apt to be much more influenced by the wishes of the national leaders. I do not mean that all the big Trade Unions commonly vote on one side, and most of the local Parties on the other; but there does tend to be a preponderance of left-wing opinion in the latter and of right-wing opinion in the former, at any rate when political rather than directly economic matters are being decided. The great question now is whether there will prove to be a large and vocal enough body of opinion against the arming of Germany or against the proposed level of military expenditure to swing a majority of the Trade Union votes over to the opposition side. No one can yet tell about this; but there is undoubtedly a large body of Trade Union opinion which is strongly critical of last week's Party decisions.

In the voting last week, I think it can be taken as certain that a good many of those Members of Parliament and of the Party Executive who voted in the majority did so, not because they liked the prospect of a re-armed Germany or held the Attlee-Morrison policy to be wise, but because they were afraid of the consequences of voting the other way. Some had fears that unless they agreed the Americans would withdraw aid from Europe and retire into isolation, or at any rate give up the idea of defending

Western Europe with land forces in the event of war. Others feared that, unless Western Germany were brought into the European Defence Community, the Americans would unilaterally re-arm the Bonn Republic and thus re-establish an uncontrollable German national army, to the even greater danger of European peace. Only a very few fanatical anti-Communists, I think, would have voted in favour of any kind of German re-armament unless the Americans had been insisting on it.

To me, and to most of the Socialists with whom I am at all intimate, this yielding to American insistence appears altogether wrong. Already, Great Britain is spending on armaments much more than is consistent with the proper maintenance of British industry by means of adequate capital investment; and the recently issued Defence White Paper giving the estimates of expenditure for the coming financial year involves not only higher immediate spending, but also an indefinite continuance of expenditure at the higher, and probably at a rising, level. The re-armament of Germany, far from enabling Great Britain to spend less on arms, will mean spending more, both because the Germans will cease to pay for our army of occupation and because, in order to re-assure the French, we shall be called upon to provide more soldiers to offset the danger of German preponderance in the armed forces of the West. The whole policy of which the arming of Western Germany is part is thus most seriously prejudicial to British economic prospects, and indeed quite inconsistent with the declared aim of making Great Britain economically independent of the United States and able to stand on its own feet.

These considerations, however, weighty though they are, are not the main factor in causing many British Socialists to oppose German re-armament. I, for one, put foremost my belief that the arming of Western Germany will both immensely strengthen the reactionary elements in the Bonn Republic and increase the danger of war. On both these points the German Social Democrats whom I know agree with me. They are well aware that there exist in Western Germany both a large body of persons who have been indoctrinated with Nazism and are dreaming of a war of revenge and a great mass of impoverished refugees who are set on egging on their countrymen to a war for the recovery of the lost provinces in the east. They know that these elements form an extremely explosive mixture which a rehabilitated military caste could easily set ablaze. They look with horror on the prospect of rival German armies, supported by rival great Powers, facing each other along an artificial land frontier, at any point of which some awkward incident might at any time occur — or be deliberately provoked. They have reasonably expected help from their fellow-Socialists in other countries in the stand that they have taken against re-armament in their own country; and if the Socialists of other Western countries abandon them, it is difficult to see how they can stand out, or avoid having their prestige and influence weakened by the fact that they have resisted so far.

The argument most often advanced by those who defend the arming of Western Germany is that, without it, a Western land army capable of resisting a Russian attack cannot be built up. This is in all probability true; but how much does it matter? It would matter, if there were any ground for believing that the Russians are contemplating, now or for the future, a war of aggression upon the West; but all the evidence I know of points to the conclusion that they are not. Had they entertained any such intention, they would surely have acted on it before now; but the one thing that all the competent observers I know of seem to agree about is that both the Russian people and their leaders are desperately anxious to avoid world war, and that to this extent their peace campaigning is entirely genuine, however naive it may often appear. Nor can it be questioned that the re-arming of Western Germany is bound to appear to them, whether it is in truth or not, a provocative act directed against their security; and I cannot see how they could have been expected, at the Berlin Conference, to agree to the unification of Germany except in conjunction with a firm assurance that German re-armament would not be pursued. Therefore, I cannot blame the Russians for the failure of the Berlin Conference to arrive at any constructive result; nor can I believe that the Americans went into it with any intention that it should.

In saying this, I am not accusing the American Government of deliberately planning world war. Like the Russians, they would much sooner get their way without

it, and sooner accept stalemate than consciously provoke it. They have, however, certain conditions which they want to satisfy; and one of these is to get their army of occupation out of Germany as soon as they can, and replace it by Europeans. They see no prospect of doing this without a German contingent, whether it takes the form of a contribution to a combined West European force or of a German national army; and their principal motive in putting pressure on France and Great Britain to accept German re-armament is not to make war on the Russians, but to get their own soldiers home. Nevertheless, there are in America not a few irresponsible persons in high places who are allowed by their Government to carry on propaganda for a war of „liberation“ in Eastern Europe, and who will ally themselves with the most dangerous, Nazistic elements in Germany in the hope of using them as abettors in their plans. The activities of these American pressure groups, and the failure of the American Government to do anything to restrain them, naturally scare the Russians and their supporters in Czechoslovakia and Poland, in Hungary and in the Balkans, and ensure that no effective approach to an international détente shall be made.

I think many British Socialists who do not belong to what is regarded as the left wing of the Labour Party feel this, and are not disposed to blame the Russians only for the Berlin failure. They expected the Conference to fail, because they could see no bridge between the American and the Russian approaches to the German problem. Some of them cherished hopes that the British Government would have some third solution to put forward; but I doubt if anyone thought this really likely in view of the British Conservatives' close ties with their American counterparts and of what was already known about the British Government's Defence proposals, which have since been published.

These proposals, the real nature of which is carefully left obscure in the Government's White Paper, involve a policy entirely different from that which was put forward by the Labour Government at the time of the Korean crisis. What was then adopted was a programme of very heavy spending on arms for a period of three years, during which military preparedness was to be raised to a high level agreed upon with the Americans. When this had been done, expenditure was to be greatly reduced; for it was assumed that the cost of maintaining the higher level of preparedness would be very much smaller than the initial cost of arriving at it. In fact, it proved impossible to carry out the projected programme in three years without crippling the British economy, and the time allowed for its completion was extended to five years, still on the assumption that it would then become possible greatly to reduce the cost. This assumption the new White Paper wholly abandons: it holds out the prospect of continuance for an indefinite period ahead both of a crippling burden of Defence expenditure and of an inflated land army involving two years of full-time service under arms for the conscript young.

The reason for this drastic change of policy is mainly that during the past three years the technical conceptions of what is involved in war preparation have been completely revolutionised. The present policy requires an enormous new expenditure on atomic weapons and long-range atomic bombing planes, not instead of, but added on to the cost of maintaining a large navy and a large army equipped with conventional arms. Whereas the Americans, with immensely greater resources to draw upon, are substituting atomic preparations for other forms of military expenditure and are cutting down their land armies, the British Government, despite its economic weakness, is setting out to meet the cost of both forms of warlike preparation, and to incur liabilities which will involve the continuance of the double burden for as long ahead as it is possible or profitable to look. In practice, I feel no doubt that the plans that are now being laid will turn out to be quite impracticable, and that Great Britain will speedily be forced to choose between cutting its expenditure on arms and facing economic collapse. But for the time being, the proposals stand; and the Labour Party, if it persists in the policy which has just been narrowly endorsed, will in effect disable itself from offering any convincing opposition to a rate of military spending that makes nonsense of all the economic part of its recently adopted Party Programme.

For the more the Germans are allowed to re-arm, the more troops Great Britain will be called upon to hold available for European service. For the Americans the creation of West German divisions holds out the prospect

of being able to reduce the size of their occupying army in Europe, by handing over the land defence of the West to the new West European army. But the French will certainly not agree to the establishment of such an army under conditions which will mean a German preponderance in it. They will demand, if they agree at all, a British force to offset the German contingent, committed to action in Europe. In effect, arming the West Germans will involve Great Britain in arming, not against the Russians, but against a potential threat of revived German militarism.

Nor can I think that the French Socialists who require guarantees of British participation in any European army in which German contingents are to play a part are unreasonable — except in being prepared to accept Germany's re-armament on any terms.

Twice in my lifetime the militaristic elements in Germany have been allowed to get on top and German armies have overrun Europe and been barely beaten back after they had inflicted immense sufferings and indignities on the lands they had invaded. Even if, in the first world war, the fault was not wholly on the German side, the greater part of it was, and the violation of Belgian neutrality marked the essential contempt for international law of the German military mind. On the second occasion, with the Nazis in power, the case was one of unshamed and exultant aggression, and the only blame falling on those whom the Germans attacked was for their politeness or cynicism in coming to terms with the aggressor and allowing him to build up his power unchecked. Can it be either good international morality or good sense to-day to put arms back into German hands and in doing so to encourage the re-emergence of the very forces in Germany which in 1945 were pledging our help to "good Germans" to eradicate once and for all? As a Socialist and a believer in international friendship, I feel an unqualified obligation to my German comrades not to betray them into the hands of militaristic reaction, to my French comrades not to expose them to a renewal of the German threat, and to my Russian comrades — for they too are my comrades — not to give them what they are bound to regard as plain proof that hope of coming to terms with them has been abandoned, and that the Western democracies will stop at nothing in order to build up a military force that is evidently directed only against them.

I should be opposed to German re-armament whether the proposal was to re-arm an unified Germany, or only a part. I make no charge against the German people of being militarists by ineradicable national disposition; but I do hold that there is evidence enough of their recent proneness to fall under the spell of exaggerated nationalism and to allow the worst elements among them to gain control. I do further believe that the effects of Nazi indoctrination upon them have by no means worn off, and that it is impossible to feel any certainty about the use to which they will in the long run wish to put any armaments they are allowed to have. I do not, of course, believe that it is possible to keep the Germans disarmed indefinitely except on the basis of an agreement to which the Russians as well as the Western countries are parties. But I hold that the right course is to work for such an agreement, involving the constitution of an unified German Republic, and that there could be a fair hope of Russian acceptance of such a solution, were it once made clear that the American project of re-arming the Germans was being definitely given up. I believe that there is in the British Labour movement a large and growing body of opinion that favours such a solution.

By the time this article appears, the effects of the Bri-

tish Labour Party's representatives' meeting with their opposite numbers in the European Parties belonging to the Socialist International will have been felt and the argument about German re-armament will presumably have moved on a stage further. For my part, I fervently hope that the Attlee-Morrison group will not succeed in persuading either the French or the Germans to endorse their line, and that continued opposition on their part will keep the whole question open until there has been time to get the present British policy reversed. In the meantime, those of us who, in Great Britain, are opposed on principle to the Attlee-Morrison policy are bound to find ourselves in a difficult position; for we have to conduct vigorous propaganda against it, and at the same time to avoid getting ourselves disciplined for going against the Party line. Fortunately, even in the higher quarters of the Party, opinion is so divided that disciplinary measures are unlikely to be taken against dissidents unless they behave very foolishly. The Labour Party has a tradition of allowing a wide measure of freedom wherever matters of conscience are involved; and for many of us the question of re-arming Germany is a matter of conscience because of our sense of obligation to our fellow-Socialists abroad and because we regard it as a matter of principle to keep the door open for accommodation between East and West, and do not believe that the Russians, at Berlin, had any intention of banging it in the faces of the Western Powers.

During the next few months, then, a great debate will be going on inside the British Labour movement not only about German re-armament and the future level of public expenditure on armaments, but also, in connection with these things, about international policy as a whole. For the moment, this debate will tend to thrust into the background other controversial issues and in particular the issues of domestic policy which divide the right from the left wing. These other questions, however, will remain very much in the minds of the Party activists, because it is plain, on the evidence of recent by-elections and public opinion polls, that the Labour Party has been losing ground among the marginal electors and would probably lose a General Election were one to be fought to-day. Some attribute this to the absence of a sufficiently forthright Socialist policy in home affairs, and some to the Party leaders' undue readiness to co-operate with the Conservatives in international policy. In truth, it is probably attributable most of all to the fact that, for the time being, an improvement in the terms of trade — that is, in the prices of imports as compared with those of exports — has relieved the balance of payments crisis and made it possible for the Conservatives to ease up controls without actually decreasing working-class standards of living, and thus to please the middle classes without driving the working classes into revolt. How long this situation will last nobody knows: it is evidently precarious, and could end very sharply if the American business recession became seriously worse. It does, however, while it lasts, cause heart-searchings among the Labour Party leaders, who see their prospects of a return to power receding and are divided on the question whether a more aggressively socialist programme would make them better or worse. On this issue, there is so large a middle group that no clear-cut decision is at present possible. What may happen is that the debate about international policy will bring about within the Party a re-alignment of groups that will before long cause a re-discussion of the essentials of domestic policy in closer relation to international affairs and to the common problems of the Socialist Parties outside the "Iron Curtain".

„TRIESTE — AN ITALIAN REPLY TO KARDELJ“

(Continued from page 8)

"What then are the essential points which divide Rome from Belgrade at the moment? Italy insists that the discussion should deal with the whole of the F. T. T. — zone A as well as zone B — for they are both in the same juridical position and requests that the settlement should be founded on the principle that minorities follow majorities".

This, mildly said, cannot be a basis for any *modus vivendi*, because the Italian attitude still rests on insatiable demands for territories which are ethnically, nationally, economically, and geopolitically Yugoslav. Only the uninitiated reader might be impressed by Italy's alleged "good will" and her skilful manoeuvring with the term *modus vivendi*.

In this discussion we have dealt only with those arguments of the Italian pamphlet which the Italian Embassy in London considers to be most convincing. To refer to any other points would be superfluous since these few details alone will enable the reader to form a just opinion about the "Italian reply" to Kardelj.

One Year of Malenkov's Government

IN the assessment of Soviet policy since the death of Stalin the measures taken by the new leadership are interpreted either as a subjective issue of the leaders themselves whose conceptions differ from Stalin's, or as an inevitable consequence of the crisis which arose after Stalin's death. Both hypotheses lead to a false assessment of the policy which is being pursued by the Malenkov government.

Stalin's death was not the cause of the crisis, nor of the changes which took place later on, although being an intrinsically important event which aggravated the already existing crisis by the loss of Stalin's authority.

The crisis of the system began and developed while Stalin was still alive, its forms and effects being the same as after his death (economic, social and political stagnation, apathy of the producers, discontent among the broad masses of the people, passive resistance of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe etc.). The measures implemented after the death of Stalin could also have been taken earlier for the same reasons and with more or less the same interpretation as that offered by the present leadership. Consequently Stalin's death was not the immediate cause of the crisis, but provided only a suitable reason for the revision of the previous home and foreign policies.

The crisis of the system as a whole had already constituted a major obstacle to the Stalin government in practical everyday policy. However the methods by which it attempted to resolve it only resulted in its further aggravation both in the domestic and foreign policy fields. The last years of the Stalin Government were marked by a further stiffening of the absolutist regime, the strengthening of bureaucratic and police pressure in all spheres of social life in the country, the increase of exploitation and pressure against the countries under Soviet control and the aggravation of cold war, which even led to open conflict in Korea.

After the death of the architect of such a policy, Stalin, the position of the Malenkov government was far from enviable. The highly developed system of autocratic government and police violence almost completely paralyzed all social and scientific activity, while the economy was in a state of depression. Apart from this the death of Stalin put the fight for power and the necessity of consolidating the new leadership on the agenda. The balance of world power had changed to the detriment of the Soviet Union, so that it was necessary to undertake urgent and resolute measures in all directions.

It could not even be expected that the new leadership would have its programme fixed in advance, as the fraction which assumed power after Stalin's death had no definite conceptions as to the further conduct of Soviet policy. The new leadership consisted of men who, with Stalin, were the creators of the system and policy which led the Soviet Union into such a situation. In order to find a way out of the blind alley, the new Soviet rulers had to choose between two alternatives: either continue along the road traced by Stalin, or revise the line of policy pursued so far. For the former alternative they had both sufficient experience and a well organized system of power and coercion, but it was no less obvious that the continuation of such a policy would inevitably lead to serious internal and external conflicts of which the ultimate results were extremely hard to foresee. For this line of policy, however, they lacked the prestige and authority of their predecessor, as the consolidation of their position required time, while

on the other hand the situation made delay impossible. The other course of action, i. e. the revision of Stalin's policy could not be limited to individual spheres of policy, as changes in one direction would inevitably call forth changes in other fields of activity, which could in the long run result in loss of control over the further development of events.

Already in the first few months the new government took a series of new decisions: the reorganization of the government and party leadership, important personal changes, amnesties, rehabilitation of the doctors, and changes in some aspects of foreign policy. But all this did not enable one to discern the new course of Malenkov's policy, as the new measures were so isolated, incomplete and even mutually contradictory in some cases, that uncertainty as to the objectives of Soviet policy continued.

The Malenkov Government had first to pass through a period of consolidation when it strived to ease the conflicts brought about by the crisis of the system, playing for time and strengthening its ranks for a more resolute policy in the future, even at the price of considerable concessions in the sphere of both home and foreign policy. This period of consolidation, which can be considered more or less accurately to have lasted until August 1953, was also marked by the greatest concessions. In this phase Malenkov worked in all directions, while devoting the greatest attention to the most urgent issues. The new rulers, although neither willing to bring or desirous of bringing radical changes of policy, were no less unable to spare the most drastic forms of the Stalinist rule. Practical policy demanded more definite changes of the Stalin line of policy, and Malenkov did not hesitate in making them, even at the risk of discrediting the Stalinist conceptions.

The necessity for collective leadership, the strengthening of the role of the Party among the masses, the fight for legitimacy, for the limitation of power and police control, as well as the necessity of granting greater individual and national freedoms, and devoting greater attention to the standard of living has been stressed repeatedly in connection with the amnesty and rehabilitation of the doctors, the recent price reduction and other measures introduced during the past twelve months. This was also stressed by Malenkov in his speech at the April session of the Supreme Soviet when he awakened in the Soviet people hopes that the new rulers would pursue a more realist policy and devote greater attention to the interests of the masses. This of course was also reflected in the sphere of foreign policy. The new leadership adopted a different approach towards the settlement of the Korean conflict, eased immediate relations with the countries of Western Europe and the USA, and assumed a much milder attitude towards its neighbouring countries (Turkey, Scandinavia and the Near East). Even the countries of Eastern Europe felt some benefits therefrom, as certain changes have been enabled or effected in the purpose of relieving the crisis. The Soviet endeavours calculated at representing the USSR as a peace loving country and minimizing the impression of the constant danger of Russian aggression, in order to cripple or at least slow down the further organization and strengthening of the Western world, has assumed the form of a large scale „peace offensive“. Needless to say, Yugoslavia could not be left out in such a grand action. The normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and Israel, the abandonment of aspirations to Turkish territories and similar moves were all taken in order to make this peace offensive more convincing.

A change of leadership occurred in some of the Soviet-dominated countries while statements were even made to the effect that changes in the home policy of these countries were impending, primarily in the field of agriculture and the standard of living.

However, this period failed to yield any lasting results. All these measures in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe in the field of home policy as well as in the field of foreign policy failed to eliminate the fundamental causes of the crisis. Malenkov only succeeded in awakening in the masses the hope that their position would improve, but the problem remained unsolved. The open dissatisfaction which prevailed in Soviet-dominated countries (particularly in East Germany) at the time of the new Soviet measures, was suppressed, but this does not mean that the possibility of its recurrence has been eliminated. World tension has relaxed, which only proves that Soviet policy was its chief cause, but the danger of a new tension has not been removed.

However the most important achievement of the new government's activity in the period of consolidation of power is that it has realized the gravity of the situation and likewise realized the maximum possible extent and direction of the modification of the policy it had pursued so far, without jeopardizing the subsistence of the system itself.

Only the measures implemented since the August session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the September plenum of the Central Committee, and the subsequent decisions can be considered as a manifestation of a stable and long range policy.

In many spheres the concessions made proved dangerous. They created illusions of more radical changes to come, gave rise to new demands, and threatened to exceed the limits which insured the security of the system. Concessions to non-Russian peoples, the mitigation of criminal legislation and police pressure, the strengthening of party influence and control over the masses, a more liberal attitude towards the intellectuals, were to prove extremely thin ice in practice for the Soviet system, or in other words showed that by adopting such a line of policy, the Soviet leadership could easily lose its firm grip on the situation, thus leading eventually to the disruption of the system. In the beginning this was a suitable way of winning the confidence of the people, but as it developed this process had to be checked and vigilantly controlled. Hence the leadership was unable to go any further from its initial measures.

Malenkov concentrated on Soviet economy, primarily the increase of agricultural output and the production of basic consumer goods. The stagnation and even the decline of agricultural production became a major obstacle for the further development of Soviet economy. The new leadership realized the danger which might ensue from the maintenance of the standard of living at its present low level. The impossibility of raising the production, the problem of high production costs, unusable and low quality products, all these issues had to be resolved in close connection with the standard of living problem. The urgency of this problem forced Malenkov to revise the extant plans, to abandon a series of capital projects, shift funds to light industry and agriculture, while directing a good part of the heavy industry and machine industry towards the production of consumer goods.

The decline of agricultural production was established as a fact, but they refrained from going deeper into the causes of such a situation. The blame was thrown on the investment policy, and the present attempts to resolve this

problem are limited to the introduction of new resources into this branch of economy. The investment policy doubtless is one of the causes underlying the present serious situation in Soviet agriculture, but on the other hand, it is no less true that there are hundreds of thousands and even millions of tractors and various agricultural machinery, while the decline of agricultural output continues, which proves that the fundamental causes lie in the system of production, in the position of the immediate producer. However, with the exception of insignificant concessions and efforts to increase the incentives for greater production, the new leadership abstained from all measures which would alter the prevailing relations, thus proving that it does not intend to make any concessions which might threaten the State capitalist system in the Soviet Union. The introduction of new means in agriculture, with the parallel growth of tractor and machine maintenance stations (MTS), should ensure the increase of production while at the same time ensuring and strengthening the role of State-capitalist relations in agriculture.

Malenkov's home policy reveals far greater realism on the part of the present government, and shows that it is not apt to overestimate the subjective forces, nor underestimate the pressure of the people, and that it is ready to revise the Stalin policy in those spheres and within those limits which do not threaten the security of the bureaucratic system and State-capitalist relations in production. A certain liberalization of life as compared to the Stalin system of rule has been carried out, more attention is being devoted to the standard of living of the broad masses, and measures are being taken to reduce the disproportion in economy, but always with due caution so as not to weaken the position of the bureaucracy. Basically, these changes are being effected within the programme set to perfect the State capitalist bureaucratic system. These changes may even assume the form of a certain democratization, but only as long as they remain within this framework.

Foreign policy is also subjected to this task. The strengthened Malenkov government does not intend to go a step further than the measures taken during the period of consolidation. Due to the immense internal difficulties of the Soviet Union and the countries under its control, the slackening of international tension is extremely desirable, all the more so as the Soviets have already lost the armament race in which they themselves set the pace, and because the balance of power has changed to the detriment of the Soviets. The Soviet leaders would find a period of peace extremely convenient as it would enable them to work on the solution of internal problems and to prevent the West from carrying out its military and political plans. The Soviet Union is vitally interested in the development of its foreign trade and will continue its efforts in this direction, while at the same time striving to use this for the achievement of its aims, — i. e. to emerge from its isolation and separate the countries of Western Europe, Asia and others from the USA.

The Soviets do not show the slightest inclination however (nor feel themselves obliged) to abandon the positions acquired during and after the war, being perfectly satisfied with the present status quo.

By his moves so far Malenkov has revealed his line of policy, which, although showing a more realist approach to the situation, greater flexibility of outlook and capacity of adjustment to the newly created circumstances, still retains the foundations of a policy which can easily lead back to an identical situation as that which confronted the USSR at the time of Stalin's death.

Chronological Review of Important Events in Balkan Cooperation

On 28th February last just one year had elapsed since the signing of the Agreement on cooperation and friendship between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in Ankara. Although a relatively brief period has elapsed since the act, that important event in the life of the three Balkan countries received confirmation and justification in the firmness of sincere ties and justified interests uniting the three countries in a resolve to build in this area an all-round and firm mutual cooperation on the principles of equality, independence and defence of peace. The Tripartite Balkan Agreement has asserted itself in international relations as a valuable instrument of equal regional cooperation in the service of peace and progress.

In its issues No. 91—92, 93 and 94, the „Review of International Affairs“ marked the first anniversary of the Agreement by publishing articles from the pens of Ministers-Signatories of the Agreement and numerous prominent personalities not only from the three countries concerned, but also from non-Balkan countries. These articles dealt with the principles on which the spirit, meaning and perspectives of the Agreement are based.

The chronological review which we give below, records the more important events in the development of cooperation between the three countries which preceded the official conclusion of the Agreement, as well as those which came after February 28, 1953.

1947

September 18, 1947 — The first post-war trade and payment agreement between Turkey and Yugoslavia was signed in Belgrade, when conditions were created for exchange and reciprocal application of existing regulations on imports and exports. The agreement provided for payment in free dollars. The agreement contained no commodity lists.

1950

January 5 — Turkey and Yugoslavia signed a new trade agreement in Ankara, as well as a *modus vivendi* for the application of preferential tariffs. The agreement fixed one year contingents and provided for mutual payment through a clearing arrangement in USA dollars.

January 5. — A protocol was signed in Ankara on the compensation for Turkish property and interests in Yugoslavia, providing among other things for the setting up of a mixed commission the task of which was to establish the amount of compensation, in keeping with the actual value of property, rights and interests.

1951

January 12 — saw the signing in Belgrade of an agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia on the regulation of the frontier-area railway connections.

March 15 — Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement in Belgrade on the establishment of a two way regular air service on the line Belgrade—Skoplje—Salonika—Athens on a reciprocal basis.

April 10 — The first post-war trade and payment agreement was signed in Belgrade between Greece and Yugoslavia. This agreement marked the beginning of the revival of commercial exchange between the two countries.

1952

February 2. — Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement in Salonika on the suppression of cattle diseases, which also provides for mutual exchange of information regarding the appearance and spreading of diseases as well as application of joint measures for the elimination of disease in the frontier areas.

July 4 — saw the friendly visit to Belgrade of a delegation of the Greek National Assembly headed by the President of Parliament, Mr. Dimitrios Gondakis. Referring to friendly relations between the two countries, Mr. Gondakis said in one of his statements during the visit: „This development seems to me to be not only natural, but also to arise from the common interest of two nations imbued with exalted ideals, one of which is protection and defence of peace in this part of the world.“ The delegation stayed in Yugoslavia up to July 18, 1952.

August 7 — Mr. Fahredin Kerim Gokay, the vali and President of Istanbul arrived in Belgrade, where he stayed, as guest of the People's Committee of Belgrade. During his stay in this country Mr. Gokay also visited Zagreb, Ljubljana, Skoplje and Dubrovnik.

August 8 — A delegation of Turkish journalists arrived in Belgrade as guests of the Association of Yugoslav Journalists. During their stay in Yugoslavia, members of the delegation were received by Marshal Tito, on the island of Brioni on August 20. On this occasion Marshal Tito declared: „During the last few years we have shown in practice that cooperation is possible between countries which have identical interests although their internal systems are not the same“.

August 16 — An agreement was signed for the purchase in Turkey of 100,000 tons of wheat on credit for a year. The agreement was supplemented on January 15, 1953 with a new arrangement for the purchase of a further quantity of 50,000 tons of wheat on the same terms.

August 21 — A Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, headed by Moša Pijade, the then Vice-President of the Presidium of the Yugoslav National Assembly, arrived in Greece. „We are now building a new era of friendship between the two nations. This friendship is called for by the international situation and danger from aggression. That is why we should march together, for the two nations have common interests“ — declared the head of the Yugoslav delegation Moša Pijade in Athens.

September 16—24 — The Yugoslav military delegation headed by Colonel-General Pavle Jakšić visited Greece.

September 24—28 — The Yugoslav military delegation headed by Colonel-General Pavle Jakšić visited Turkey.

October 17 — Presidents of the People's Committees of Belgrade, Zagreb and Skoplje arrived in Istanbul for a visit of friendship.

October 22 — A delegation of Yugoslav journalists arrived in Turkey. In an interview given to the Yugoslav journalists, the Turkish Foreign Minister M. Köprülü, pointed out: „Turkey and Yugoslavia have been brought closer together through the policy which they pursue, and that is the policy of the peoples' independence and struggle for peace“.

November 23—30 — The Greek military delegation, headed by General Joanu Hristos, visited Yugoslavia.

December 19—28 — The Turkish military delegation headed by General Haki Ismail Tunaboylu visited Yugoslavia.

23-XII-1952 — 1-I-1953 — A Turkish economic delegation headed by M. Enver Güreli, Minister for National Economy and Commerce, visited Yugoslavia. The delegation examined the possibilities for an extension of economic relations between the two countries.

December 26—30 — The Yugoslav military mission headed by Major-General Miloš Šumonja visited Athens.

December 30 — The Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece agreed to raise their Legations in Athens and Belgrade to embassy rank and mutually to accredit Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

1953

January 22 — Mr. Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, arrived in Belgrade for an official visit. During his stay in Belgrade, Mr. Köprülü conducted official talks with representatives of the Yugoslav Government. „Cooperation between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, which is taking shape, will constitute — both in view of the peaceful spirit with which it is imbued and the recognition of international solidarity which it implies — a very decisive link in this front of joint defence“ — declared Mr. Köprülü after his conversation with Marshal Tito. On the same occasion Marshal Tito pointed out: „We have the same tendencies — to preserve our free peaceful development, our independence and integrity“.

January 27 — A parliamentary delegation of the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic arrived in Belgrade. Mr. Hulusi Keymen, head of the delegation, declared on his arrival in Belgrade: „Such visits between nations will contribute to the strengthening of friendship and facilitate the protection of the common cause of peace“.

January 29 — An official statement was published on the occasion of the conclusion of talks which, after his official visit to Yugoslavia the Turkish Foreign Minister conducted, with the Greek Prime Minister, Marshal Papagos, and Foreign Minister, Mr. Stephanopoulos. The statement stresses the satisfaction felt „at finding that there existed complete unanimity between the two Governments on the development of their relations with Yugoslavia with a view to joint security and maintenance of peace“.

February 3 — The Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Stephanopoulos, arrived in Yugoslavia for an official visit. It was pointed out in the communiqué issued on Yugoslav—Greek talks conducted during the stay of Mr. Stephanopoulos that „these talks revealed complete identity of views, especially of the views in the field of joint security“, and that „in consideration of the identity of views it is possible to fix more definitely the ways and forms to be adopted in the tripartite cooperation to be continued in the future“.

February 17—20 — A conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the three countries was held in Athens for the purpose of drafting the joint text of the agreement. Yugoslavia was represented at this conference by Ambassador Radoš Jovanović.

February 17—20 — The first meeting of representatives of the General Staffs of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was held in Ankara. The Turkish military delegation was headed by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Zekaiokan, the Greek by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Dovas, while the Yugoslav delegation was headed by Lieutenant Colonel-General Ljubo Vučković.

February 22 — Koča Popović, Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, left for Athens and Ankara.

February 26 — The following new economic agreements were signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia: a convention on trade and navigation, which regulates the principles of navigation, trade and traffic between the two countries; a Commercial agreement which provides for exchanges amounting to 70 million dollars both ways; a Payment

agreement which raises the manipulative credit from 500,000 to 3 million dollars; and a Protocol on finances, which regulates the opportunities for the purchase of wheat in Turkey on credit terms.

February 28 — An agreement was signed in Ankara on cooperation and friendship between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. The agreement was signed: on behalf of the Turkish Republic by Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, on behalf of the Kingdom of Greece by Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and on behalf of FPR Yugoslavia by State Foreign Secretary Koča Popović.

February 28 — An agreement on economic cooperation and goods exchange was signed in Athens between Greece and Yugoslavia to a value of 18 million dollars, as well as a payment agreement. A separate protocol provides for cooperation in the field of mining, agriculture, exploitation of water forces, electric power, transport and tourism.

April 16 — A Turco—Yugoslav agreement on air transport was signed in Ankara providing for the opening of a regular two-way air service between Belgrade—Istanbul.

May 15 — A Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, headed by the then Vice-President of the Presidium of the Federal National Assembly, Moša Pijade, arrived in Turkey. On that occasion the head of the Yugoslav delegation declared that this visit would be a further step towards the strengthening and development of mutual friendly relations.

May 20 — June 5 — Mijalko Todorović, member of the Federal Executive Council, visited Turkey and Greece. On that occasion he conducted talks with the competent Greek and Turkish circles for the extension of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and those two countries.

June 3 — A conference of representatives of the General Staffs of the three countries began in Athens with the object of making recommendations to the Governments regarding the taking of measures for the strengthening of cooperation in the military field. The Yugoslav delegation was headed by Lieutenant Colonel-General Ljubo Vučković. The conference lasted till June 12.

June 24 — The three Governments issued a declaration to the effect that they would exert their efforts towards the settlement of problems which are causing tension in the world.

July 7—11 — A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries was held in Athens. The conference decided to set up a Permanent Secretariat for preparing conferences, which is to examine and draw the attention of the Governments to any question that may come within the framework of the political and cultural cooperation of the three countries. The Secretariat will consist of a high-ranking diplomatic representative of each of the three countries and one permanent office. The General Staffs of the three countries have been entrusted with the task of considering at their next meeting the bases for the advancement of tripartite military cooperation, as well as corresponding forms of that cooperation. It was also decided at the conference to set up an ad hoc committee consisting of economic experts who are to examine the possibilities and methods of tripartite economic cooperation.

September 19 — The big manoeuvres of the Yugoslav People's Army (from 14th till 28th September 1952) were attended by the military delegations of Turkey and Greece. The Turkish delegation was headed by Brigadier General Selim Sun, while the Greek delegation was headed by Lieutenant General Constantin Dovas.

November 10 — Talks began in Belgrade between the military representatives of the three countries. They ended on November 20. This conference reached agreement on all questions of joint defence in the event of aggression. The communiqué pointed out that the talks again confirmed the firmness of the Balkan Agreement and its significance for the strengthening of peace in this part of the world.

1954

February 24 — The representatives of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in the Permanent Secretariat, Ambassadors Spyros Capetanides, Agah Aksel and Ljuba Radovanović established the Permanent Secretariat which is to be in session in Belgrade under the chairmanship of Ljuba Radovanović until the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries. At that meeting Mr. Constantin Himarios, Greek representative, was appointed chief of the office of the Permanent Secretariat.

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Problems of Democracy

(Continued from the previous issue)

(IV) DEMOCRACY WITHIN ENTERPRISES

AS already mentioned, we consider that democracy within enterprises constitutes an essential implementation of political democracy. Without it, democracy is not a real and full democracy. Democracy within the enterprises is closely connected with the problem of socialization. Stalinism went astray when it socialized the economy, leaving the management of it to the dictatorial forces. The effect of these measures was totally destructive: not only the Social-Democrats had to acknowledge that the worker in the Soviet Russia had been exposed to a still worse exploitation than that prevailing elsewhere; but the rulers of the Kremlin had to realize that forced labour is always unproductive, and that is why the Soviets lagged behind capitalist States in their effort to dominate the world.

Formerly, Marxism never spoke of State ownership but of socialization and the difference between the two is not purely a formal one. The position of the worker in a State-owned enterprise is wholly dependant upon the character of the management of that enterprise. In State-owned enterprises the situation of the workers is sometimes much worse than in those owned by private owners, because the State enterprise is in a position to exercise not only economic supremacy, which characterizes the enterprise in its relation with the workers, but to exercise the political power of the State as well.

Marxism was energetically rejecting both State capitalism and State Socialism. We cannot discuss at length here whether it is possible to make a clear-cut distinction between the two. The State control of economy, from our point of view, is just a transitory phase leading to social ownership. The more numerous are Socialist elements, the more the State is deprived of its original characteristics of organized rule, the more urgent becomes the need to look for and to find new forms of social ownership.

These new forms should not lead to the handing over of enterprises to the toilers who are working there. Society as a whole, and not the workers, own the enterprise, and its management is responsible to the former. That is why the representatives, elected in accordance with democratic procedure, of the district bodies are bound to supervise the enterprises. Consumers will also be asked to take a part in it, because socialism should, in the first instance, contribute to the improvement of the standard of living through cheap and abundant supply of goods of high quality. The economic system which does not achieve this end is inferior to capitalism and shall never enjoy the support of the majority of the people. Socialism is not an organization for the sake of such organization; it should improve the lot of the broad masses of people. If it does not succeed in that, it shall never be able to triumph as an economic system.

The control of the public and of the consumers should not deteriorate into a bureaucratic system which would hamper the production and make it rigid. The maximum output in industry can be achieved only under conditions of complete freedom, and the management and the workers of an enterprise shall only then be fully aware of their responsibility if they can act quite freely. Any attempt at curbing the initiative will end in the renouncement of responsibility and, eo ipso, in the diminishing of productivity.

Economic enterprises are in need of a management capable of reaching quick decisions. That is why the ingenuity of the directors and other responsible men must not be restrained. On the other hand, their feeling of responsibility must be increased to the maximum. In this way, democracy is not being handicapped but, quite the contrary, we have then a correct application of the principles of democracy. The initiative of the individuals is not restrained in political democracy either, but the problem of their personal responsibility is a matter of serious concern.

The feeling of responsibility confined only to the management will not do. Success is to be achieved only if all workers and employees, and not only the management, do all in their power to increase the productivity of the enterprise to the highest possible level. It is necessary to fulfil two conditions in order to achieve this end. First, the workers must be economically well provided for and have a feeling that the socialist enterprise offers them such opportunities as are denied to capitalist enterprises; second, such institutions should be established which would lead to the awakening of a feeling of individual responsibility.

There are various ways at hand to achieve the first condition. A high wage level is still the most effective method which is to be preferred to the profit-sharing system and to subsidizing. The second factor are the councils of enterprises which are being derived from the idea of workers' councils. We have previously shown that in the economic field, i. e. in the democratic organization of enterprises, this idea was very successful, while it lost its ground in the political field in the countries under the Communist domination.

The system of councils within the enterprises contributes to the weakening of hierarchical rigidity within the enterprises just as the federative system diminishes the degree of coercion exercised by political hierarchy.

What holds good for villages and municipalities holds good for enterprises also: everybody has a feeling of occupying the right place, and are convinced they are performing a useful and necessary task, all workers know one another, everybody understands the problems involved and feels capable of making up one's mind about them. In this way the feeling of estrangement is being mitigated. This same feeling is weighing down the citizens in their relations towards the modern State because its political problems are so complex that the individuals are in no position to form an opinion on them and to reach necessary decisions.

(V) THE PARTY AND THE „WITHERING AWAY OF THE STATE“

Almost all democracies, in their advanced stages of development, use the same methods of organization. Political parties are coming into being as a result of an identity of interests. The first real political parties were created in ancient times when townspeople, peasants and the aristocracy wanted to influence the State rulers, each of these classes acting in accordance with its respective economic and political interests. A similar thing happened in the Middle Ages, but the political parties reached their maturity in the Modern Ages.

The same economic and social interests are, as a rule, constituting that force which is prompting people to form their political parties. It is true that the process is not as simple as some people are now imagining it. In most cases, the exploiters and those exploited come into conflict with each other. The process of establishing political parties is sometimes quite different. In the first half of the 19th century, Liberals and Conservatives were the representatives of one and the same class of exploiters. In spite of that, they were on most unfriendly terms, doing their best to associate themselves with their real class enemy — the working class. They fought for the sharing of profit between the land and the gains of those who owned the enterprises. That was a thing which divided the two ruling classes. The Conservatives, who had vested interests in land, inaugurated a social policy, while the Liberals did their best to attract the workers by abolishing the duties on corn. Enmity towards the workers became only later a decisive factor in the formation of political parties.

American political parties never became parties of a European class type. The Republicans, owing to peculiar historic circumstances, form an alliance between big capital and farmers, while the Democrats, in the North, are the representatives of „the common man“, i. e. of the workers and employees, of the intelligentsia, of Catholics, Jews and Negroes who are considered to belong, from the social point of view, to a lower social stratum. The Democrats, in the South, however, rely upon the big landowners and are trying to discriminate against the socially weak, first of all against the Negroes, but also against the Trade Union members. The two Parties were lately developing along class lines. They will probably develop along these lines in the future as well, but the process is far from being finished.

In democratic Europe, the labourers have created their Socialist and Labour Parties. They have been established by labourers themselves and exist alongside with the parties of the bourgeoisie as organizations enjoying equal rights. The fact that socialism, as a social idea, is exercising a strong attractive force not only upon the working class, but also on the broad masses of people, which are not directly interested in the survival of capitalism, is being reflected in the success of socialism to align the smaller or greater parts of the so-called peripheral strata of society. It would be wrong to conclude that this leads to the weakening of the socialist character of these Parties. Quite the contrary, these people are joining the Socialist Parties because they hope that socialism will improve their lot.

In this way, one can explain the fact that the class-boundaries and the Parties are not quite identical. It is impossible for them to be so, because the lines dividing the Parties are clear-cut while those dividing different classes are not, and cannot be such. Not a single Party aligned all the members of the class on behalf of which it acts and never has been confined to members of that class only.

Formerly, Marxists were of the opinion that a completely developed system of political parties, working freely within the framework of the democracy of the bourgeoisie, secured to the labourers the best prospects of progress. This view was held and propagated by Lenin himself, right down to the Second Russian Revolution. He abandoned it only when the Bolsheviks came into power. From then on he cursed the whole democratic system, and the Party system as well, with one exception only, that of his own Party. From that time onwards, the Communist Party in Russia has been a monopolistic organization and all the dictatorships which later came into being, irrespective of their origin, acted in accordance with the model set by Lenin, i. e. they established one single Party. When dealing with this aspect of the problem, it is often forgotten that the meaning of the political party is thereby being lost. Just as the concept of „People's Democracy“, is a nonsense in itself, so is the concept of the one party system. The word „party“ is related to the Latin word „pars“, meaning „a part“. The mere term shows that the existence of one party implies the existence of another, if not many other, parties. If these other parties do not exist, then the single party is nothing else but a special State apparatus which, for some special reasons, exists side by side with the State bureaucracy. The one party system is, therefore, nothing else but an outcome of dictatorship, and all this is in a glaring contradiction with democracy itself.

Since Lenin's book „The State and Revolution“ was published, it has been constantly stressed that dictatorship

is a transitory state which will finally lead to the withering away of the State. When the process of withering away of the State is completed, the parties will also have to wither away. It is justifiable then, in this transitory period, not to tolerate any new Parties because „socialist democracy“ is in no need of this link between the Government and the people.

Dealing with this argumentation, one is inclined to ask why it never occurred to the representatives of the Communist Party to begin with this process of the dissolution of the Party in their own house. If all the parties are bound to wither away with the withering away of the State, this should hold good for the Communist Party as well. As the Communist Party keeps on existing, it is impossible to see why it should be an exception to the general rule. The criticism that under the Communist regime only some other socialist political groups, — let us not use the word „parties“ here, — are being tolerated, but not so the groups of the property-owning classes, is forcing us to ask: who is deciding what is the meaning of „socialist“, which are the criteria to be used in reaching such a decision and who entitled the Communists to solve this question in advance while the opportunity is being denied to the whole population to say what they think, although this is a problem which concerns them most? But, irrespective of that, it seems to me that it is inadmissible to predict now that the future socialist communities shall be able to go on living without political parties. Marx and Engels were never of the opinion that the future society should be deprived of any organization. In their controversies with anarchists, they constantly and very energetically held the opposite view. According to Engels, the authority organized by the State will become an administration which shall command no force. This does in no way imply that, within this administration, all views and interests shall be identical. It does imply that the persons who sympathize with various views and share different interests shall form their own groups so that in this case a new type of political parties shall emerge. These parties, of course, shall not fight to capture the power within the State, because the State itself shall in no way be an organized power, but they shall fight to get the Administration of the community to put their views into practice.

Marx and Engels said nowhere explicitly whether political parties were going to exist in the future non-class society or in the transitory period leading to such a society. Marx always spoke disparagingly of those who make „recipes for the kitchen of the future“. He thought it much more important to describe clearly the general tendencies of development than to dwell upon individual phenomena, or even to define the future forms of development. Discussion on the accurateness of the idea that the State is doomed to wither away, seems to me quite out of place, because in Marx's thought, the idea of the State was intricately bound to the idea of the organization of power. Marx would never define the State as a social organization devoid of force, existing in order to administer economy and society. The transitory form of the „social welfare State“, which is already existing in many democratic countries, i. e. a State combining the elements of a social policy with the elements of democratic economy, would probably constitute in Marx's eyes a transitory type leading to the non-class society which, owing to this, does not possess any State organization in the original sense of the word.

To Marx it would almost certainly be more important to recognize full liberty of association and action to those groups which have been formed in order to represent common views and interests, than to bother whether they could be considered as parties or not.

(VI) DEMOCRACY AND THE PROCESS OF FULLY DEVELOPED POWERS OF THE PROLETARIAT

When the problems of democracy are discussed, it is often overlooked that it is not only an organizational form but, also, the most important educating factor of the working class. Democracy is, in itself, a thing that cannot be dispensed with by the working class because this class is either the most numerous class of the total population, or is bound to become such in the course of the economic development. It is most advantageous for it to act in such a State in which the great number plays a

prominent part. Democracy is just such a State in which majority rules. That is why the working class in all industrially developed countries favours the idea of democracy while it favours, in its underdeveloped forms, the idea of the dictatorship of the minority. The strength of this idea is indicative of the primitive character of industrial conditions and, consequently, of the labour movement itself. This held good for Lenin's Russia and is holding good for the majority of countries in which Communism is playing an important role today. One could even say that this idea is gathering force in the East, in the area inhabited by backward peoples, and that is why one can safely guess that in the foreseeable future China will replace Russia as the centre of the „proletarian“ revolution.

In 1905, Lenin was still convinced that the revolution of the bourgeoisie must come before that of the proletariat. He rejected this correct view in 1917 when his highly developed instinct for power made him think that the current circumstances were offering him such chances to come into power as might never appear again. The principle which he proclaimed in 1917, i. e. that all those who try to come to power by other means than by „political democracy“ will come to „absurd and reactionary conclusions“, — ceased to exist for him. The labour party became in the eyes of Lenin of 1917 „the vanguard of the proletariat“ which will be able „to lead the whole population towards Socialism“. Lenin was not interested in the problem of what should be done to educate the whole population in order to enable it to achieve this end. From then on he was interested in that vanguard only.

What influence was exercised by dictatorship on that vanguard, on one side, and on the total population, on the other? The Russia of Stalin is giving us an answer which is both precise and disastrous. Unlimited power was always a factor of general corruption which vitiated both the ruling and the subservient social strata. The Bolshevik Party which, at the beginning, was a group of daring, self-sacrificing and heroic fighters for freedom, has become a gang of brutal and cowardly bureaucrats, hungry for power. It is sufficient to read the self-accusations of those charged with the crime of deviation from the „general Party line“, to see how low the former fighters for freedom have sunk. The change this group of men has undergone could hardly be better characterized than by quoting a poem which is being sung in the Soviet Zone of Germany, — the line at the end of stanzas being „The Party is always right“.

The broad masses have also been corrupted but not to such a great degree. The Russian people which, in a series of peasant uprisings, workers' rebellions and strikes, in the course of centuries, protested against the Czarist oppression, were unable, ever since the Kronstadt uprising, to organize any political action against the Bolshevik dictatorship.

This is the result of the fact that a vanguard, under dictatorial leadership, is leading a whole people towards socialism. Lenin, who so diligently quoted Marx, took special precaution not to quote one of his most important sayings:

„While we tell the workers: You must be prepared for 15, 20, 50 years of civil war and national struggles in order not only to change the present conditions, but also to transform yourselves and to be educated for the exercise of political power; you, on the contrary, tell them: We must come to power at once, otherwise we may just as well go to bed“ („Discoveries dealing with the Cologne Trial of Communists“, Berlin, 1914, p. 52 et seq.).

„In order to transform yourselves and to be educated for the exercise of political power“, — that is the basic idea of all democratic, socialist parties. Socialism is not a mathematical problem which could be solved by means of the number of proletarians or by means of the amount of horse powers used in industry. The working man must be the champion of socialism, and such a man must be able to think, to feel and to be able to work. His education was a thing which Marx considered of the utmost importance. Marx was haunted by this idea. That was the reason why he held August Bebel in such a high esteem. Bebel was a master of organization, and organization has never been just an instrument of power but, always and much more than that, an educational means for the working class.

It is beyond any doubt that the economic conditions must reach a certain high level to enable socialism to come into being. This level cannot be reached by revolutionary impatience. Such a state of affairs cannot even be accelerated in this way. A good Marxist must learn from his teacher that particular stages of social development cannot be jumped over.

The maturity of conditions, however, is not sufficient. There is a need of men who would be mature enough not only to want socialism, but also to create such an organizational form of the society and an economy which would be appropriate to socialism. At such a time a feeling of responsibility shall be the most important. It is not enough if these feelings inspire just a vanguard. These feelings must be deeply rooted in the masses of toilers, if it is desired to have economy yield higher incomes and a greater welfare to humanity than capitalism.

Dictatorship exercises a negative influence on the feeling of responsibility. Democracy, through its practical work, is the only form of government capable of educating the masses in this sense and enabling them to manage a free, flexible and non-bureaucratic socialist economy. This sound opportunism is the reason why we are democrats.

With this article Mr. Benedikt Kautsky has ended his discussion of the problems of democracy, in the frame of a discussion with comrade Veljko Vlahović, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the SAWPY.

In our next issue we shall publish an article by comrade Veljko Vlahović, in which he will give his opinion on Mr. Kautsky's views.

VLADIMIR STOJANCEVIC

The First Serbian Rising and Its Time

This year the peoples of Yugoslavia celebrate the 150th anniversary of the First Serbian Rising organized by the Serbian people in the beginning of February 1804 against Turkish domination and for the achievement of freedom. In the history of the Yugoslav peoples this Rising of which the strong military, political and ideological impact threatened the very subsistence of the Turkish empire in the period from 1804—1813, marks the beginning of the revolutionary struggle of the people for national freedom and independence. This is the first time that the Yugoslav peoples celebrate this important anniversary in complete freedom and independence, liberated from all foreign domination and influence whatever, thus investing the First Serbian Rising with its real significance and place in the history of the Yugoslav peoples.

THE period of the first Serbian Rising from 1804—1813 is considered by Yugoslav historians as the restoration of the Serbian State which was destroyed in the 15th century, after vain attempts to revive it by the end of the 18th Century, and the beginning of a new era in the history of the Serbian people. The First Serbian Rising goes beyond the national frontiers of Serbia proper, by its importance both from the Balkanic and European point of view. During its ten year span it constituted a major internal problem of the Turkish empire as its manifest military and political impetus and the powerful influence it exerted on most of the Christian populations of the then Turkish Bosnia, Rume-
lia and Bulgaria, as well as its numerous and close ties with official Russia, Austria and France, surpassed all similar movements by their importance. Complex as to its numerous causes, awesome and glorious in its successes on countless battlefields in encounters with the Turkish Army, the Great Rising steadily broadened the basis of its action as well as the ideological and political motives and programme of its struggle, thus gradually assuming the form of a nationalistic and revolutionary movement which, for a certain time, particularly in 1806 and 1807 seriously threatened not only the security, but also the very life of the Ottoman Empire.

The fundamental tendency of its development was the achievement of maximum independence from Turkish rule, first that of the Dahis (janizary leaders) and later the imperial rule as well. The fact that these aspirations towards the achievement of political emancipation were successful until 1807, was largely due to the dynamism and strength of the Serbian people and the notable aid received from volunteer formations of fugitives and emigrants from all the neighbouring regions of the Turkish Empire and Austria. In 1807 Serbia became an ally of Russia who was engaged in war with Turkey since the end of 1806, the territories of Walachia and Moldavia being the cause of dispute. However, as Russo-Serbian collaboration did not prove satisfactory or efficient enough for the subsistence of the revolt, the Serbs gravitated towards France as soon as 1809, seeking the support of this country in their further struggle against the Turks. In view of the fact that Austria had also played a prominent part, although mainly of a neutral and mediatory character, in the Turko-Serbian conflict since its very beginning in 1804, it can be truly asserted that the First Serbian Rising drew all the leading European powers into the whirlpool of its conflict with the Porte. Thus it came to pass that the development of events in Serbia, the Balkans and Europe, deprived

this rising of its local and isolated character and invested it with the significance of a major European issue in the extremely delicate field of diplomatic conflict.

As the then strongest among all the similar contemporary separatist and regional-nationalist movements in the Turkish Empire, the First Serbian Rising attracted the general attention and interest of all official circles in Europe. Apart from diplomats and historians, its importance was best grasped and most intelligently and reasonably interpreted later on by that great European and historian, Leopold Ranke, both as a contemporary onlooker and subsequent commentator. His work „Die Serbische Revolution“, the first historical study of the Serbian Rising, dealt with the Serb movement as an European event apart from its local importance in the Balkans.

I.

The First Serbian Rising has its own long prehistory. Its outbreak is the result of many individual causes which arose as a consequence of a specific trend of development of Serbia in the 18th Century, especially in the last decade. It was only partly a consequence of the general circumstances that prevailed in the Turkish Empire at the turn of the century.

The general environment, geographical position and ethnographical factors which witnessed the birth of the First Serbian Rising were best described by Jovan Cvijić in his work entitled: „The Balkan Peninsula and the South Slav Countries“: — „The weakening of the Turkish Empire“, he wrote, „gave rise to certain tendencies among the Balkan peoples, who strove to free themselves from Turkish domination. The Serbian people, who were the last to yield, were the first to rise and sound the call to freedom, and succeeded, — after eleven years of incessant struggle, — (1804—1815) to form the nucleus of a national State in the Morava watershed. The new State was not restored on the territory of old Raška, but on the periphery of the Turkish empire in Šumadija where the population of ancient Raška, — or basically the same element which created the old Serbian State, had settled after migration. The fact that there were no Turks or Moslems in Šumadija except in the citadels also contributed to the success of the movement as well as the circumstance that the „chitluk“ system¹⁾ was weaker in this area, thus accounting for a

¹⁾ chitluk — Turkish feudal landholding.

large number of free peasants. Apart from this the whole region was a real forest stronghold, and even enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the years which immediately preceded the Rising: remote from Constantinople, Šumadija bordered on the Serbian population of Hungary on the other side of the Sava and Danube.

This peripheral position later greatly facilitated the fight of the Serbs in the First Rising, as it protected at least one flank from armed Turkish action. At the same time this position also enabled the more or less unhampered supply of the insurgents with food, arms and ammunition. Apart from this, „it was also logical from the political point of view that the Serbian issue should arise at the meeting point with Christian Europe.“

The political situation which prevailed on the eve of the Rising marked the concluding stage of the Austro-Turkish conflict over the domination of the Central Danube basin. The conclusion of the Peace of Svištovo in 1791 in fact marked the end of the century-old struggle between the countries of Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire, i. e. that chapter of European history which opened with the second siege of Vienna in 1683. In this period of Christian „Reconquista“, the participation of the Serbian border formations and the volunteer detachments on the Austrian side in fact represented a substantial portion of the Austrian military potential, this being further enhanced by the circumstance that war was waged on Serbian ethnical territory, particularly that of Serbia proper which represented the actual field of battle four times in the course of the war, i. e. in 1688/90, 1716/18, 1737/39, and 1788/91. In the last war which Austria waged against Turkey, the ratio was so high that operations on the Sava—Danube sector were almost exclusively limited to the recruitment of the local Serbian population organized in the so-called „Freikorps“ and the Serb and Croat border troupes. This absence of regular German troupes in Serbia, which represented the main theatre of operations in this war due to the paramount strategic importance of Belgrade and the Constantinople Road, is so obvious that the Serbian historians were absolutely right in naming this war „Koča's Krajina“. This participation of the Serbs in the war against Turkey in special military units, with their own military organization and leadership was to prove of extreme importance later in the First Rising.

The Serbians hoped that this war which Austria waged in alliance with Russia against Turkey would enable them to free themselves from Turkish domination with the aid of the Christian powers, but were disappointed after the Austro-Turkish reconciliation based on the recognition of territorial „status quo“. When Russia, the second partner of this „coordinated action“ followed suit and concluded the 1792 Jaši Peace Treaty with Turkey it was clear that the partition of Turkish territories (according to the „Greek Project“ of Empress Catherine II in 1782) and the liberation of the Balkan Christians had been postponed indefinitely, due to the obvious impotence of the anti-Turk alliance. Although Serbia had borne the brunt of this war, having suffered both the greatest economic and material damage and loss of life, only one of the obligations stipulated by the Turko-Austrian Peace Treaty proved in favour of the Serbian people, i. e. general amnesty for all Turkish citizens who took part in the war on the Austrian side. The attitude of the Austrian military and political circles towards the Serbian people is described in an interesting and characteristic Serbian historical document of that time, which records the conversation between Aleksa Nenadović, „oborknez“³⁾ of the Valjevo district and former Freikorps officer, with the commander of the Serbian Freikorps, Imperial General Mihaljević, after the withdrawal of the Austrian troupes from Serbia: „It is true I have sworn allegiance to the Emperor and sworn that I would fight against the Turks for the freedom of my country, and you know that I have not forsworn my oath or betrayed the Emperor, but it is the Emperor who is forsaking me and the Serbian people, just as his ancestors did with our forbears. That is why I am going back to Serbia, and as I have no scribes or other learned men I will go from monastery to monastery and tell every monk and clergyman I see to note well in every monastery that never shall Serb believe German again.“ After such experiences, left entirely to their own resources,

the Serbian people in the Belgrade district and elsewhere began striving towards a certain degree of national and social cohesion and organization in the modern sense of the word. The favourable regime in the pashalik between 1793 to 1801, as well as the strong influence exerted by the patriarchal and church tradition on all strata of the Serbian society by the end of the 18th Century and the propaganda of nationalism and enlightenment diffused by the Serbian rationalist authors in Southern Hungary fostered the nationalist idea among the Serbs. This circumstance was to play an important part later on in the creation of a general political programme of resurgent Serbia in the First Rising.

In his efforts to restore Turkish power Sultan Selim III acting in the spirit of his reforms pursued a policy of pacification and restoration of order in Serbia. He forbade the janizaries to return to Belgrade. Even before the war the janizaries had shown themselves unmanageable and prone to disorder and violence, while incapable and unfit for the defence of the Empire in wartime. In the purpose of developing the economic resources of this rich and enterprising Turkish province and insuring greater regularity and efficiency in the collecting and levying of taxes, the Porte issued two firmans (in 1793/4 and 1796) which provided the basis for the development of a certain autonomy in Serbia, the so called „knežinska samouprava“ or autonomy of the local knez. These privileges were of course limited but, to a certain extent, similar to those enjoyed by the Islands of the Ionian Archipelago in olden times. The autonomy of the Belgrade pashalik (the knez acts as intermediary between the Turkish authorities and the Serbian people, Turks are forbidden to settle in Serbian towns, taxes and duties are established, property and personal security guaranteed as well as freedom of church service, national army used for the defence of the pashalik from the evicted janizaries and Pazvan Oglu in Vidin) which pacified Serbia, regulated the feudal obligations of the Serbian people towards the spahis⁴⁾ and the other representatives of the Turkish administration, and insured the development of the national life of the zadruga,⁴⁾ villages and districts of the Belgrade pashalik, had a very favourable effect on the general social and economic prosperity of the Serbian people. The rapid rise of agricultural production, the large volume of exports of swine to Austria, the expansion of the home market and internal trade, the increase of Austrian transit trade with Rumelia and the Levant via Serbia on the Zemun—Belgrade—Čuprija—Niš route, converted Serbia into one of the most productive and flourishing districts of the Turkish empire in the Balkans. Apart from the greatly weakened feudal system and almost free initiative of its industrious and enterprising population, the colonization of the sturdy Dinara mountaineers and the hard-working peasants who immigrated from the Kosovo area and the valley of the Southern Morava also contributed to the steady economic development of the Belgrade pashalik. This immigration from the interior of the country resulted in the clearing of vast tracts of land and in the founding of new settlements, as well as in an influx of Serbian trading, exporting and business elements in the cities and towns. This dynamism of Serbian economic and social life enhanced by the increase of national wealth closer ties and better business connections among the people themselves, on one hand, and with Austria on the other, also influenced the creation of a special stratum of prominent citizens, who enjoyed a special reputation and position with the common people, the Turkish authorities in the cities and the Austrian commanders in Srem and Banat by the end of the 18th Century. These distinguished citizens and „men of property“ — the so called kneževi, the owners of the ferryboats on the Sava, the Danube, the Morava and the Kolubara, and other resourceful men who became engaged in the swine trade or moved to cities where they dealt in various branches of business — were the actual exponents of Serbian autonomy. These men actually represented the embryo of the Serbian bourgeoisie which was then being created. It was this stratum who took the economic development of the country in their hands, guided it, and credited it among the broad masses of the people. It is this group of men

³⁾ Turkish feudal landowner.

⁴⁾ A specific form of social group composed of several families claiming descent from a common ancestor, bearing the same family name; every zadruga had its „starešina“ or chieftain. — The zadruga corresponds roughly to the Scottish clan.

³⁾ oborknez — knez — A title roughly corresponding in peacetime to that of bailiffs in England.

engaged in business and local self government, this young bourgeoisie of peasant origin which numbered many debtors among the representatives of Turkish authority and which only lacked political and military power in order to organize the new regime so as to correspond to the requirements of the new era, the new economy, and new capitalist relations in politics, society and culture, who will — in conjunction with several leaders of the hajduks⁵⁾ and national army (organized on a broad basis by the vizir of Belgrade Hadji Mustapha Pasha) — acquire especial prominence and repute during the Dahi⁶⁾ rule in 1801—1804, and the preparations for the First Serbian Rising.

One of the immediate causes of the Rising was the return of the janizaries into the Belgrade pashalik and their forcible seizure of power over the Serbian people. Having abolished the legitimate imperial administration, and evicted the spahis from their possessions, the cadis and musselims, the janizaries and their leaders, whom the Serbs called the Dahis, established their own political and economic system in twelve districts of the pashalik, similar to that of Pazvan Oglu in Vidin. Through their representatives, the „kabadahis“, the „bimbashas“, „buljubashas“ and „subashas“ they persecuted the Turks who had remained loyal to the Sultan and the former exponents of legitimate authority in the pashalik, and guided by their inordinate greed for money and riches and their thirst for vengeance, the Dahis introduced a reign of terror, thus disrupting the foundations of the prosperity and security of the Serbian people, i. e. the autonomy of the kneževi. By imposing the chitluk regime and a system of military and administrative control over the economic output of the Serbian agriculture, the Dahis infringed upon the sacrosanct rights of the patriarchal regime of the Serbian village and the social and economic life of the old zadrugas. During their two year rule, until the beginning of 1804, the Belgrade pashalik was the scene of large scale abuse, exploitation and violence, while disorder and insecurity reached such an extent that the numerous cases of outlawry (hajdučija) appeared as a kind of armed resistance against the Dahi rule of terror. It was clear that the situation afforded only one solution, i. e. the total annihilation of one of diametrically opposing sides, the Dahi rule of terror and tyranny, or the autonomy of the knez which was rapidly disappearing and was now but a pale shadow of its former privileges. In constant fear for their lives and power, the Dahis effected the so called „massacre of the knezes“ in 1804, treacherously killing over 150 knezes, merchants, prominent Serbian citizens, former commanders of the national army, clergymen and monks. This large scale massacre, accompanied by the penetration of the entire Dahi armed force from its fortified cities into the interior of the pashalik, followed by numerous manhunts organized by the army and police force, brought the obvious political and social contradictions between the Dahis and the Serbian village to its culmination, and provided the immediate cause for the outbreak of the revolt. The Rising began at the most unsuitable time of the year, as stated in our folk song „in mid-winter when it is not done“, by the burning down of the Turkish hans (inns) and the killing of subashas, i. e. by the destruction of those basic Dahi institutions which represented their rule in the pashalik. The meeting of Serbian leaders in Orašac and the burning of the Turkish han in Sibnica in the beginning of February 1804 are considered as the beginning of the First Serbian Rising.

II.

In Yugoslav historical literature the first and best account of the genesis of the Rising was given by an eyewitness of these events, the father of modern Serbian literacy and historiography, Vuk Karadžić. In his work „The First Year of the Serbian Fight against the Dahis“, Vuk writes: „As soon as word reached the people that the Turks were killing the knezes and all prominent men, many took this as a warning, went into hiding or fled from the Turks. Thus, the Turks beheaded those who answered their summons, or whom they found at home, but not having time to search for those who had hidden away, let them alone and hurried on with their hunt and killing

⁵⁾ Serbian patriot outlaws who fought against the Turks.

⁶⁾ Janizary leaders.

lest people should hear of their coming and flee. Thus they sent several of their men to the village of Topola in the Kragujevac district to kill Black, or KARA, GEORGE whom they knew to be a hajduk and dangerous man, and highly respected among the people as a prosperous merchant. At that time George was herding swine to the ferry, but when he heard of the imminent danger, he let the swine scatter and went into hiding with the swineherds he had hired for the occasion; when the Turks arrived and did not find him, they returned whence they had come. However, the people, who were fed up with Turkish misrule, had become increasingly restive: as nobody knew why the Turks were killing people, everyone feared for his own life. At last when people started counting among themselves and it transpired that this man had been slain, that one shot, the other one taken prisoner, yet another had gone into hiding, fled, or was absent when they had come for him, then all the fugitives started looking for each other. It was then that Black George and JANKO KATIĆ (former buljubasha (captain) in the time of Ali Mustaj Pasha from the village of Rogać in the Belgrade district) and many other fugitives met: then they began seeking out and rallying the hajduks who were sheltering with their jataks (peasants who gave them food and shelter in the winter) at that time of the year, and began putting their heads together as to what to do next: „The Turks“, they said, „have thought of all possible acts of violence to commit against us, and have at last decided to kill and slaughter us all. We have no choice but to defend ourselves and hit back: it is better to die a man's death, making them pay dearly for our lives and thus avenging our brothers, than die like defenceless women in shackles and be killed by their executioners and servants: what if we lose our children and homes, — they no longer really belong to us.“

The sudden upheaval caused by the Turkish massacre and frequent manhunts gradually began transforming itself into a real movement of an entire people. In several days' time, the whole of Sumadija, the central part of the Belgrade pashalik, was seething with movement, rallying into formations which were mostly commanded by the hajduk leaders and their men, commanders of the former national army as well as the knezes of the individual knežinas. The revolt broke out simultaneously in several parts of the pashalik. The rising on the other side of the Morava river was organized and led by Milenko Stojković and Petar Dobrnjac, the former an ex-buljubasha (captain) and the latter a hajduk in his youth. Western Serbia was led by the Nenadovičes, Jakov and Prota⁷⁾ Mateja brother of the slain oborknez Aleksa, and the men of the hajduk commander Djordje Čurčija. With an impetus which filled the Austrian border zone commanders with admiration, with all the vigour of effervescent national energy, the spirit of revenge being roused by wounded national pride, („everyone should avenge his forbears“) within a short time, scarcely two months, after several dozen encounters and battles, the Turks were routed in the interior of Serbia, and forced to seek refuge in the fortresses of Belgrade, Šabac, Smederevo, Soko and Užice.

All the attempts of the Dahis to suppress the insurgents and make them lay down their weapons voluntarily were of no avail. The Serbs established contact with the Austrian border zone officers and sought Austrian protection. The commander of Zemun, Major Mittesser and Captain Scheitinsky were the first Austrian military representatives with whom the Serbian leaders maintained contact. By the end of April the latter met with Karadjordje who acquainted him with the wish of the Serbian people to put themselves under Austrian protection, so as to avoid applying to some other power, being in a difficult position and not wishing to yield to the Dahis. However, Austria who was at that time engaged in war with France, was interested in the preservation of Turkish neutrality and refused official and direct intervention on behalf of the Serbs. However, not wishing to alienate the Serbs completely, Austria offered to act as mediator at an eventual Turko—Serb meeting. Such a meeting actually took place in Zemun, where the representatives of the Belgrade Turks and a Serbian deputation elected by the first Skupština (Assembly) of insurgent leaders in Ostružnica (by the end of April) met in the presence of the military commander of Srem and Slavonia General Genein. No settlement was reached however. Continuing the siege of the Turkish citadels, the Serbian leaders submitted a written petition to

⁷⁾ Parson of the Orthodox church.

the Russian Envoy in Constantinople asking for Russian aid. In the meantime the number of Serbian insurgents rose to 25,000 men, while the Dahis were reinforced by the arrival of the well known krdžali*) leader Gušanac Alija with about 800 of his horsemen.

The Porte which was already used to the disobedience of some pashas, conflicts between the ayans, and frequent rebellious movements throughout the Empire, did not take the Serb revolt against the Dahis seriously in the beginning. It was only in July of the same year that the vizier of Bosnia, Bećir Pasha arrived in Belgrade to settle the dispute between the Serbs and the Dahis in his capacity of representative of the Porte. When the Dahis attempted to seek refuge with Pazvan Oglu in Vidin and were intercepted on the way and killed by the Serbs according to secret orders issued by Bećir Pasha to the Commander of the Adakale Island, the city of Belgrade was occupied by the krdžalis. Having achieved practically nothing, and having no authorisation to use force against the new usurpers, Bećir Pasha returned to Bosnia, while the new vizier of Belgrade was enthusiastically received by the krdžalis as their old Dahi friend and ally. The Serbs remained armed. The sultan's attempt to influence the Serbs to disband and conform to the administrative measures of the new Belgrade vizier Sulejman Pasha through the Walachian leader Ypsilanti also remained without result. The fundamental divergence lay in the Serbian demand, that with the exception of the citadels, the Turks should not be allowed to live on the territory of the pashalik, which was contrary to the firman the sultan ordered to be made public in Belgrade according to Bećir Pasha's previous recommendations by the end of September 1804. Apart from verbal promises made by the Turks, the Serbs demanded concrete guarantees for their security, which should be confirmed by one of the neighbouring Christian countries, primarily Austria and Russia. When Austria, in spite of the reports of her internuncio in Constantinople to the effect that the Rising was a serious matter which would not be quelled easily, failed to fulfil Serbian expectations, they turned to Russia.

The Serbian deputation which left for Russia in 1804 consisted of Prota Mateja and Petar Novaković, a former captain of the Freikorps, and carried a written petition requesting aid in money and arms, and asking Russia to act as guarantor in an eventual Turko-Serb agreement. Apart from this, the delegates demanded the establishment of Serbian autonomous administration under the name of „Serbsko Upravljenje“, modelled along similar lines with the autonomous status of the seven Ionian Islands, with the obligation to pay a moderate duty to the Turks and the right to maintain their national army to safeguard Serbian autonomy. However, despite all Serbian endeavours and allusions to the link of „blood, language and religion“, the Russians, like the Austrians, refused to take any active part in the discussion of the relations between the Serbs

and the Porte. Refusing effective aid, while offering certain limited financial support, they advised the Serbs to reconcile themselves with the Porte by sending a Serbian deputation to the sultan. Such a Russian attitude was based on the friendly policy of Russia towards Turkey and their alliance against Napoleon which dated from 1799, as well as on the concessions made by the Porte in favour of Russian interests in Walachia and Moldavia in 1802 as regards the appointment of the local hospodars with Russian consent. After this, having failed to enlist the interest of Emperor Franz I. in the cause of the Serbian rising, the Serbs decided to send a deputation to Constantinople.

The Serbian deputation which was sent to Constantinople in May 1805 and which was composed of Prota Mateja Nenadović and the merchant Stevan Živković, attempted to get a confirmation of Serbian autonomy at the moment when the Porte, having realized the dangerous revolutionary character of the Serbian Rising and its connections with Austria and Russia, and particularly angered by the futile attempts of the Constantinople Patriarch and the Walachian princes (in the spring of the same year) to bring the Serbs back under imperial authority decided to settle the Serb question by armed force. The Porte further believed that such an action would infuse new vigour into the badly shaken imperial prestige in the Belgrade pashalik, and, on the other hand, prevent the Serb Rising from becoming a pretext for diplomatic interference of Austria and Russia into Turkish internal affairs. Therefore Hafis Pasha of Niš was appointed new Vizier of Belgrade with full privileges and authority to settle the Serbian issue in favour of the Turkish and Sultan's prestige. The rebellion of several clans in Herzegovina, the rising in the Niš and Pirot district, and the people's revolt in Crna Reka, obviously under the influence of the Rising in the Belgrade pashalik, justified this decision of the Porte. However, Hafis Pasha's military advance on Belgrade ended by his defeat at Ivankovac in the beginning of August 1805, and was shortly followed by his death. The attempt of the Porte to restore imperial authority in the Belgrade pashalik through the intervention of the Imperial army ended at the Turkish expense by the battle of Ivankovac, and in favour of the Serbian insurgents. Serbian historians consider that the first period of the Serbian Rising, i. e. the period of self defence and struggle against Dahi rule, ends with the battle of Ivankovac, which at the same time marks the beginning of the direct struggle of the Serbian people against the Porte. The battle of Ivankovac opens the second phase in the Serbian fight for freedom, transferring the revolt into the neighbouring areas and regions of the Turkish empire. This offensive attitude of the people, which gained immense stimulus after the defence of the imperial army and the formation of rebellious movements inside Turkey, began assuming the form of an extremely far-reaching revolutionary movement. At the same time it evolved against a more intricate and broader background of international policy, against a more complex balance and interplay of European political, diplomatic and military powers as a result of the Napoleonic wars.

*) Turkish outlaw fighters in the second half of the 18th and first half of the 19th cent.

New Social Plan and Budget of FPRY

A series of legislative proposals, including the Federal Social Plan, the Federal Budget and the Bill on the Ratification of the Supplementary Agreement of the Balkan Pact, were enacted at the seven day session of the Federal People's Assembly which adjourned on March 11. The Federal Social Plan and the Federal Budget regulate this year's economic development of the country. Both legislative proposals were unanimously approved in the same wording by both houses of the Assembly, Federal Council and the Producers' Council. Among the other parliamentary decisions, one should also mention a proposal for amending five Articles of the Constitutional Law. These amendments mainly provide for the compulsory convening of the third House of the Assembly, the Council of Nations, when proposals for amending the Constitution are on the agenda, while convening on all other occasions only at the request of the majority of deputies of a People's Republic, or of all deputies of an autonomous province or region.

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL PLAN

In spite of the fact that it has not devised a satisfactory solution for all problems of economic development, this year's Social Plan as adopted in Parliament is considered by the deputies and public as a sound basis for the further development of economy in view of its fundamental objectives and the economic policy it reflects. The chief targets set by this plan for 1954 are the increase of production and exports, the termination of various projects, the implementation of economic regulations and the strengthening of the legal system. The economic guidance of the country is entrusted exclusively to economic instruments, without the interference of administrative measures, so as to function on the basis of economic laws and the estimates of economic organizations. It is based on the principle that the distribution of goods produced should be effected through the market according to the laws of supply and demand. However, due to comparatively undeveloped productive forces in agriculture, the plan provides for certain privileges for the administrative organs as regards the sale and purchase of grain. This also applies to the payments traffic with other countries, and is made necessary by the instability of our balance of payments.

In view of the vigorous growth of industry during the past few years, while agricultural development lagged behind, thus causing a fundamental disproportion in the economic development of the country, the new plan provides for a series of measures for the gradual elimination of the disparity which prevails between the individual economic branches. These measures are also manifest in the new investment policy which was a subject of extensive discussion in the parliamentary Committees and a topic of keen interest both among the deputies and the public. The essence of the new measures lies in the new structure and different system of investments. This change of structure provided for by the new plan, as compared to last year, is reflected in the increase of investments in agriculture and transports, and in the increase of the depreciation fund which will be used for the maintenance of the available resources.

Investment funds in agriculture were raised from 6,400 million dinars in 1953, to 15,300 million this year. This sum does not include scheduled agricultural investments from private producers and cooperative funds which are estimated at approximately 18 million dinars. Apart from this, the plan stipulates a series of other measures for the promotion of agricultural production, such as the allocation of short-term credits under the most favourable conditions

for the procurement of the necessary implements and other requirements, while over two billion dinars were earmarked for the purpose of crediting individual producers for the supply of agricultural implements, machinery etc. Large funds have also been allotted for the building of cold storage plants, slaughterhouses, silos, mills and other plants for the processing of agricultural products.

While 24,300 million dinars were invested in transports in 1953, these funds were raised to 29,600 million dinars this year. The increase of investments in these economic branches reflects persistent endeavours to overcome the slow pace of agricultural development which underlies so many difficulties in the economic life of the country and prevents the stabilization of the market.

The most radical innovation of the Social Plan is the change of the investment system, i. e. the shifting over from crediting funds to the financing of investments on the basis of free competition among the prospective investors. All economic investments which are not made by economic organizations out of their own funds will be financed by means of credits from the general investment fund. Credits will be granted after a competitive bidding has been carried out, to those investors who qualify according to the conditions set for the allocation of credit, and who offer the most favourable rates of interest. The introduction of such an investment system actually constitutes the abolishment of the administrative system which prevailed in economy so far. But this does not necessarily imply that the policy governing investments will be abandoned, as the system of competitive crediting also enables planned guidance in this sphere by means of determining the terms of repayment, etc.

Due to an inordinate disproportion between the demand for new investment credits and the total funds available for this purpose, the plan provides that the People's Assembly should decree a compulsory loan throughout the Federation, to which economic organizations would subscribe up to 50% of the funds at their free disposal. By approving this proposal the Assembly enabled the termination of most of the projects foreseen in the course of this year, and ensured better coordination and a more rapid pace of economic development.

The general trend of the Social Plan this year in the sphere of investments is to ensure that these activities remain within the limits of our possibilities.

NEW PARLIAMENTARY WORKING SYSTEM

The discussion on the draft Social Plan and the Federal Budget was held at separate sessions of the Houses of Parliament. All previous work on the debate of these legislative proposals, which lasted almost a month, was carried out by the Economic and Budget Committees of the Federal Council and the Producers' Council. In accordance with the discussion in the Committees and the numerous proposals submitted by the deputies, the Federal Executive Council supplemented the Social Plan by a series of amendments, some of which wrought essential changes in the original aspects and provisions of the Plan (amendments on the computation of wages and salaries, measures for the regulation of imports and exports etc). This was a result of the work of the parliamentary Committees who, apart from the Federal Executive Council, also consulted various other institutions, economic enterprises and experts, while also receiving many suggestions and proposals from Voters' Meetings, workers and employees of many enterprises etc., during the debate on the Budget and Social Plan.

The role and position of the parliamentary Committees in the new system of work of the People's Assembly was already obvious at this session, a fact which, needless to say, did not pass unnoticed in the press and among the public. The general economic problems of the country were discussed before the public and the numerous amendments advanced by individual deputies and the Executive Council regarding the Social Plan and Budget testify to the endeavours of the Assembly to reach the best decisions. The immediate participation of so large a number of deputies in the preparation and enactment of decisions was welcomed by the public as showing the greater responsibility of the deputies towards their electors, while the constructive criticisms heard in the parliamentary Committees contributed to the notable increase of parliamentary influence on the entire social life of the country. It has also been noted that in the initial stages of the new working system some deputies approached certain problems with a greater sense of responsibility towards their constituency and their voters than towards the economy of the country as a whole. Their proposals were often disproportionate with the material resources of the country and the fundamental principles governing its economic policy. Such proposals were therefore rejected by the Assembly.

The debate was extremely animated at this session, particularly in the Producers' Council. The keenest interest of the public was aroused by the debate on the compensation for annual vacations. Apart from the Parlia-

mentary Committees, the Trade Union organizations also took part in the settlement of this question, while many organizations published their views and proposals in the press. Those who advocated the retention of that compensation, contended that its abolishment would lower the standard of living of workers and employees, as many working people would be actually prevented from benefiting by the vacation they are entitled to without the present facilities. The Federal Executive Council, however, adopted the standpoint that the funds granted so far as compensation to catering enterprises, and which totalled approximately 600 million dinars, would be better used for creating the necessary material conditions which will enable a large number of working people to enjoy their vacations, i. e. by building alpine hostels, by organizing holiday resorts, (by offering assistance to the Tourist and Holiday Associations, etc.). After an unusually lively discussion in the Producers' Council, the amendment proposing the retention of the holiday compensation was rejected by 85 votes against 72, with 5 abstentions.

By its new system of work the Federal People's Assembly made an extremely favourable impression on all observers of the parliamentary scene, to the effect that all decisions it may pass will be a result of radical and extensive debate, with the participation and consultation of all the organizations concerned as well as the public at large. Such a function of the Assembly will be of vast importance for the further guidance of the entire social life of the country.

B O O K S

An Interesting Study of World Economy

Harold Wilson: *The War on World Poverty — An Appeal to Conscience of Mankind*, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1953.

HAROLD Wilson has produced a fine and well documented survey of the problem of economic development in underdeveloped countries. His work is interesting not only because it is something more than a cold economic discussion and analysis of the problem we find increasingly in world literature, but because he gives a definite political significance to it. Harold Wilson is one of the leading figures in Bevan's left wing in the Labour Party.

The first part of "The War on World Poverty" is largely based on treatises of the United Nations Secretariat and various committees of experts who had studied the problems of world trade, stability and economic development. Harold Wilson begins his discussion by giving a somber survey of world poverty, and, immediately after, points to the possibilities of solving it by expanding world production and increasing the productivity of human labour. In contrast to the various ideologists of the British right wing, Wilson decidedly defends the need for industrial development in underdeveloped areas, but he recognizes the impossibility of a successful development without previous investments in non-self-liquidating projects. Among such projects he mentions the Tennessee Valley Authority, adding that such projects could well serve as

examples to other countries. In many parts of the world, in the valleys of the rivers Jordan, Indus, Euphrates and Tigris, similar projects are under construction. Discussing the realization of such projects, Wilson says that at the same time it is necessary to "invest in man", meaning in social and health institutions. But, as he himself says, such capital investments cannot be financed by the underdeveloped countries themselves. He therefore supports the proposal of a group of United Nations experts that international channels should be set up through which foreign capital, amounting to at least ten billion dollars a year, would flow to the underdeveloped areas of the world. This part of the book ends with defence of a world agency for development.

Particularly interesting are the last chapters of this work, which, in fact, constitute the draft of an international political programme. In the chapter entitled "Point Five: The Necessity for a Social Revolution", Wilson defends the idea of uprooting all feudal and sterile cliques in underdeveloped countries which obstruct successful development. He asks: how, with the presence of such cliques, are the international organs of the United Nations to pursue a successful policy without violating the principle of non-interference in the affairs of Member States?

His discussion leads him to the conclusion that countries which might be receiving assistance from the proposed international agency should give guarantees that such assistance would really be used for economic development.

Wilson thinks that an energetic drive in economic development throughout the world would ease the solution of Great Britain's economic problems as well. Here he underlines the fact that before the Second World War the average Briton possessed 80 pounds worth of property abroad, while now he owes 20 pounds to foreign countries. Britain, once the world's greatest creditor, has become the world's greatest debtor. At present Britain is linked with the countries which once made up the British empire to such an extent that it is difficult to say whether she is better off when the prices of raw materials are low or when they are high.

Wilson, it seems to us, is too optimistic in dealing with the Soviet attitude towards the problem. The talks he had with Soviet officials during his last year's visit to Moscow, lead him to the conclusion that the Soviet Union might change its present negative attitude towards world action to assist, through a United Nations agency, the backward areas of the world. He considers that Britain and the United States should do everything to enlist Soviet cooperation in such an agency, and that that proposal should not be given up even if their efforts fail. On the other hand, being aware that America herself is undecided and not ready to cooperate, he says that "if necessary

they should do it alone". Wilson holds that a decision of a majority of the members of the General Assembly to support the establishment of a United Nations Agency for economic development would force the United States to join the action. If such were not the case, Britain, he says, should stand with the majority of mankind, in a "third attitude", which would be independent of both America and Russia, since they are isolating themselves from fry the author's pessimism.

The book was written at the beginning of last year, and therefore does not include the latest developments in the United Nations, which do not justify the author's pessimism.

Wilson's account of the bankruptcy of an action by the Overseas Food Corporation is particularly interesting. Under the original plan this Corporation was to clear 3,210,000 acres of land in Central Africa, where about 600,000 tons of peanuts were to be produced, so that Great Britain would have been enabled to solve her problem of fat supplies. Wilson is well acquainted with this plan, since he himself was for a time responsible for its fulfilment, and he critically reviews the causes over which it failed. He justly says that the plan failed due to an erroneous estimation of expenditures, failure to have the soil geologically tested, to take into account expenditures for transport facilities and climatic conditions; but, in our opinion, he does not mention what is essential for economic development. The whole plan was based on the old colonial conceptions of economic development; it aimed at creating a large peanut plantation on presently barren Central African soil with cheap Negro labour. But besides these technical shortcomings there were still other, social needs that were neglected. No development can take place without man. A project of that kind cannot be achieved merely by making an illiterate peasant from a Central African village drive a tractor. Firstly, no one seemed to think about the social changes that such a project would bring about. Secondly, nobody took into account the fact that expenditures do not only include the clearing of ground, but also outlays for the building of schools, hospitals, water supplies and everything else that an economically developed community needs today. Due to all this, the failure of the Tanganyika project can be a good lesson for all those who study the problem of economic development. Economic development cannot be promoted by a new re-distribution of the world or by starting new gigantic plantations.

Wilson gave his greatest attention to the problems of industrialization, because they are the main causes of the present controversy in Great Britain. Conservative circles are forwarding ever sharper criticism of the plans for industrialization of underdeveloped areas, saying that they are results of the autarkic tendencies which are harmful to world-wide economic development. Therefore it is essential for the Labour Party to take an independent stand in the matter, a stand which will be in harmony with the strivings of the people from the less advanced areas.

Wilson, it seems, has studied thoroughly the publications of the United

Nations, but he has neglected to take into account the discussions conducted lately. Had he not done so, he would have given greater attention to the alternative: armaments or economic development. For this is the problem upon which the left elements of the Labour Party should be more decisive. Wilson justly criticizes the indecisiveness of the conservative administration in this question. But, for the sake of truth, we must say that under the Labour Government the British delegation to the United Nations also opposed the establishment of a special fund for economic development. The book, therefore, can also serve as an appeal to the Labour Party itself. For Wilson himself, together with Bevan once resigned from the cabinet in protest against the rise of defence expenditures. Since then, the question of disarmament has become a world problem, and now the underdeveloped

countries appeal through the United Nations for capital to finance their economic development. However, the United States counters their appeal by saying that it will not subscribe to the proposed fund until international control of disarmament is established.

Harold Wilson's book is undoubtedly a step further in the international socialist movement. Until the Milan congress the movement was quite indifferent towards this problem. In the last two years, however, it has increased its activities. But there are still many theoretic and practical problems of economic development of which the solutions must be boldly approached. Therefore Wilson's book is a contribution both to the study of the problem and to a wider discussion, in which our own economists, with their experience, should be very active.

J. SIK

Letter from Paris

France and the European Defence Community

PEOPLE are fond of asserting that the differences caused in all sections of the community by the debate on the European Defence Community hamper the effort which is being made to harmonize the French public opinion.

Some even think that reality forces one to conceive such effort only in relation with the final decision: for or against the European Defence Community. For the extremists of both camps meet at this border line. Foreign political issues would thus become the main criterion which would be used in the future to judge good and bad Frenchmen, reaction and progress, war and peace. We have seen that all these expressions can be replaced by each other, and that they may acquire different meanings when considered from different points of view. This political method is not new. It has flourished in periods of decadence, as well as in countries which are sliding backwards, where people divide themselves according to foreign politics, forgetting that in reality such politics originate in the internal forces of a nation.

It can certainly be said that such a simplified political alternative can afford the best protection against a direct foreign threat. The present era has been called the "cold war" period so as to emphasize that we are living in a transition period when politics and economy have a priority over military factors.

Accordingly, if these general considerations are accepted, it becomes

clear that a country can recover only if its live forces are united in the vital fields of economy, education and home politics. To act otherwise, and face the people with a single political choice without achieving a country's recovery beforehand, would be to divide a nation and pave the way for the foreign danger against which it seeks to fight.

Some people appeal for national independence; others say that France's recovery cannot be achieved without Europe's unification. Sometimes they all forward plausible reasons, but they tend to forget that there can be neither independence nor recovery unless an effort is first made to ensure France's "existence".

For has not an excellent example been given by Britain which is otherwise engaged in big issues of world politics? The Labour Party has preserved its unity many times simply by emphasizing that its foundations lie on an economic and social policy. Consequently, its unity spreads to the field of foreign politics as well.

Today, the French opponents of the European Defence Community are much worried by the revival of German militarism. They do not believe that any legal document would be capable of preventing its consequences. Why then, one may ask, do they not grasp that it is most important for Frenchmen to get together and solve the questions which still depend on us? A mere rejection of a text would be illusory if the workers and democrats of this country remain divided and if

foreign strategies continue to attract their attention.

On the other hand, the advocates of the European Defence Community are right when they insist on the need for Europe's recovery. The Democrats and Socialists consider that it would be a big step forward to get beyond the national borders and create a common market, though the essence of these institutions does not fully correspond to their ideological inclinations. This truth is valid both in the East and in the West. But the question which is being forwarded, not in principle but in view of the present situation, with all its confusion and disunity, is whether the European Defence Community would really strengthen the Europe which is being created. If the thing is urgent, why should not we begin to build the house from its essential foundations? By beginning to build the military wing of that house before laying down its economic and political foundations, one runs the great risk of making it collapse very easily. Here, however, some people talk about international guarantees, but such guarantees, just like the agreement itself, are on paper only, and we demand firmer assurances, which would consist of economic

and political developments that should be started without any delay.

Briefly, both the opponents and the advocates of the European Defence Community should, if they really care for our independence and welfare, unite and exert their efforts towards the recovery of France itself. I see no difference between the unity of the Democrats and Socialists and the plan for unity which began to be outlined around M. Mendes France. Will the Frenchmen be willing to unite in order to end the war in Indo-China, to establish a true economic and social democracy which would assure the co-management of the workers in industry, a modernization of agriculture and a change in our North African policy? Or will they instead continue to disagree and split into advocates and opponents of an agreement in which some people see the best and others the worst of things?

If they do so, they will put an end to their own independence. That is the main danger. And no voting, no taboo texts will be able to prevent it. The Frenchmen themselves must do so. Only efforts towards a real democratic and social unity can ensure our existence and recovery and save us from ruin and submission.

Jean ROUS

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